It did not take long. Within days of US president-elect Donald Trump’s election victory, Israel’s leaders up to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu became more open about their intentions for the Palestinian territories: permanent occupation, combined with the annexation of illegally settled parts of the West Bank. Or in the words of Israeli Minister of National Security Ben Gvir, writing on X: “Yesssss.”
It also is not hard to understand the jubilation. For many Israelis, not just Ben Gvir, they have fond memories of Trump’s first term. He collapsed the nuclear deal with Iran that many profoundly distrusted. He also recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the occupied Golan Heights as part of its territory.
More important to hopes in Israel’s government than even these happy recollections is that every appointment the soon-to-be second-term US president has made to his foreign policy team so far is either an Iran hawk, a fierce supporter of Israel (or indeed a greater Israel) or both.
Illustration: Yusha
Even so, it would be foolish to say we know exactly what Trump would do over the next four years. Ultimately, he is the decider-in-chief. Events, together with his perception of interests — his own followed by those of the US — would determine his choices. It is unlikely those decisions would be simple.
For one thing, Trump is likely to find it much more difficult this time around to keep his friends in Israel and the Gulf States happy. For another, his goals of ending wars and cutting deals might not always align with Israel’s. That is less a problem with Lebanon, where the question on an Israeli withdrawal was always “when,” not “if.”
Assuming a New York Times report published on Wednesday last week is correct that Israel is already rushing through a ceasefire deal as a pre-inauguration gift to Trump, that would be soon.
Yet the world has changed substantially since 2020 — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, before last year’s Oct. 7 on Israel by Hamas and before the Houthis demonstrated their power to disrupt global shipping from a perch on the Yemeni coast. Iran is also no longer internationally isolated.
Today it has deep military ties with Russia, which in turn works in a growing alliance with North Korea and China. Moscow has reportedly sent air defenses to the Houthis. Foreign policy was always a complicated game of chess, but with the more major parties involved, it would have to be played against more opponents, across multiple boards.
That is especially true in the Middle East, where popular fury over the plight of Palestinians in Gaza has created genuine constraints on Arab leaders. At the same time, Israel’s military success in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran have altered threat perceptions. Iran and its so-called axis of resistance have been materially weakened; the Israel Defense Forces are rampant.
So Arab and Turkish leaders have clarified their public positions since the US election, too. On Monday last wekk, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, also known as MBS, called Israel’s military operations in Gaza “collective genocide,” a term he previously avoided. He also warned against any further attacks on Iran.
This is the same Islamic Republic of Iran that in 2017, MBS compared to Hitler’s Germany. At the time, Saudi Arabia was engaged in a brutal proxy war against the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. Two years later, Iranian drones proved their ability to destroy Saudi oil assets with ease.
However, MBS has since wound down the kingdom’s military intervention in Yemen and restored diplomatic relations with Tehran.
On Wednesday last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said his country had cut all relations with Israel. Erdogan never misses a chance to grandstand on Muslim resentment toward the Jewish state, yet he had until now avoided breaking ties. These are all clear signals from leaders friendly to Trump that they are unwilling to be part of maximalist Israeli policies.
Of course, what politicians say on the public stage is often a poor guide to their actual plans. Arab leaders might have condemned Israel over Gaza, but they were happy to see Hamas and Hezbollah damaged and, notably, have not terminated the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel, signed during Trump’s previous term. They even quietly helped Israel defend itself against Iranian missile attacks.
“There is a whole element of theater to this,” said Jerusalem Deputy Mayor Fleur Hassan-Nahoum, who is a special envoy for innovation in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She reminded me of the origins of the accords.
It was 2019. Netanyahu had — note the current echo — announced plans to annex the Jordan Valley, an area accounting for about 22 percent of the West Bank. He said he had US backing for the move, but faced with an international outcry the Trump administration persuaded Israel to give up on the plan. In exchange, Netanyahu got an agreement from the United Arab Emirates to formally normalize relations with his country.
The United Arab Emirates was later joined by Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. Saudi Arabia had been set to sign a still more consequential deal until Hamas iced that possibility with its attack last year, and the inevitable Israeli response that followed.
Saudi Arabia will ultimately play ball with Trump on Israel, because the kingdom “is interested in one thing: a defense pact with the US so they are protected from Iran,” Hassan-Nahoum said.
That was true in 2020, but it is not as binary a choice anymore. MBS’ guiding focus is now the stability he needs for his Vision 2030 plan to diversify the Saudi Arabian economy and create jobs. Meanwhile, Iran has become less scary to the kingdom, although that could of course change if it breaks out to build nuclear weapons.
A major attack on Iran’s oil infrastructure or nuclear program — and the retaliation against Saudi Arabian assets and tanker shipping lanes it would likely prompt — would likely put MBS’ new top priority at risk. Although he might not care much about the Palestinians, his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, does. So do most other Saudi Arabians. That could limit cooperation with Israel.
Trump might again be able to square all these circles with the kind of transactional dealmaking that proved so successful in the case of the Abraham Accords. If so, Netanyahu again would not be able to have it all: annexation and occupation for the Palestinian territories, support for a decisive attack on Iran and integration with the Arab world.
Sacrificing the last of these for the former would be a poor long-term choice for Israel, as well as a human tragedy for ordinary Palestinians. It is worth remembering that last year’s Hamas attack revealed a serious flaw in the Abraham Accords: They pretended the Palestinian question did not exist.
Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
This month, the National Health Insurance (NHI) is to implement a major policy change by eliminating the suspension-and-resumption mechanism for Taiwanese residing abroad. With more than 210,000 Taiwanese living overseas — many with greater financial means than those in Taiwan — this reform, catalyzed by a 2022 Constitutional Court ruling, underscores the importance of fairness, sustainability and shared responsibility in one of the world’s most admired public healthcare systems. Beyond legal obligations, expatriates have a compelling moral duty to contribute, recognizing their stake in a system that embodies the principle of health as a human right. The ruling declared the prior
US president-elect Donald Trump is inheriting from President Joe Biden a challenging situation for American policy in the Indo-Pacific region, with an expansionist China on the march and threatening to incorporate Taiwan, by force if necessary. US policy choices have become increasingly difficult, in part because Biden’s policy of engagement with China, including investing in personal diplomacy with President Xi Jinping (習近平), has not only yielded little but also allowed the Chinese military to gain a stronger footing in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In Xi’s Nov. 16 Lima meeting with a diminished Biden, the Chinese strongman signaled little
On Tuesday, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) issued a statement criticizing Song Siyao (宋思瑤), a student from Shanghai’s Fudan University, saying she had offended the sensibilities of Taiwanese. It also called for the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation — established by former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — which had organized the tour group, to remind group members to be careful with their statements. Song, during a visit to a baseball stadium in Taichung, said that the tour group “would like to congratulate China, Taipei team (中國台北隊) ... we wish mainland China and Taiwan compatriots can be like the team Chinatrust Brothers and
“Integrated Diplomacy” (總和外交) is the guiding principle of Taiwan’s current foreign policy. It seeks to mobilize technology, capital and talent for global outreach, strengthening Taiwan’s international connections. However, without a robust information security mechanism, such efforts risk being reduced to superficial courtesy calls. Security clearance serves as the “entrance examination results” for government agency personnel in sensitive positions, qualifying them to access sensitive information. Senior aides in the US Congress must also possess security clearance to assist lawmakers in handling classified budgets. However, security clearance is not an automatic right or a blanket necessity for accessing sensitive information. Access is granted only
RSS