Indonesia, for decades a natural partner to the US because of similar defense priorities and democratic values, has in recent years drifted more toward China, drawn by its economic support. A potentially more insular US foreign policy under US president-elect Donald Trump is pushing Jakarta even closer to Beijing. The world’s fourth-most populous country would be wise to keep its options open.
Newly elected Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has already made a strategic blunder during his first foreign visit since he was inaugurated on Oct. 20. Both the former general and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) spoke about their shared ambitions and mutual trust — no doubt a signal to Washington about this growing partnership.
Beijing has wanted to position itself as the natural ally of countries in the Global South, competing with Washington’s influence with its checkbook. Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia have played it smart, balancing the two against each other, so as to ensure local interests remain paramount.
However, during his trip, Prabowo broke with decades of careful Indonesian foreign policy by reportedly agreeing to joint development with China in the South China Sea, potentially legitimizing Beijing’s claims to almost all of the contested waterway.
This sets a dangerous precedent. China Coast Guard ships have entered waters long disputed by other nations — most recently Indonesia — to show who is in charge. In the past, Jakarta has responded by expanding its military bases to better control who traverses its seas.
The South China Sea is home to huge reserves of oil, gas and fish. About 60 percent of maritime trade passes through the Indo-Pacific, and Indonesia strategically straddles the gateway between the two oceans. Maintaining freedom of navigation is essential to regional security.
The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has attempted to backtrack on Prabowo’s agreement, issuing a vague statement saying it does not officially back China’s ownership claims, but the damage has been done.
“Prabowo didn’t really have to sign on to all of those clauses to convince China to keep assisting Indonesia economically,” said Evan Laksmana, senior fellow with Singapore-based think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies.
“Based on what’s in the public domain, Indonesia has agreed to many of the points that Beijing wants, which his predecessor, [Indonesian] president Joko Widodo, never needed to do,” he added.
The economy is a major driver of the Beijing-Jakarta relationship. Under Jokowi, as the former leader is more commonly known, China became Indonesia’s biggest trading partner, and a major source of investment. Indonesia has benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with Chinese money building key infrastructure projects. Chinese investment in the nickel industry has helped turn Indonesia into a global player in the sector.
Prabowo is keen to build on Jokowi’s success, but relying on funds from Beijing comes with strings attached. Jakarta could feel pressured to soften its stance on Chinese workers by letting more in, despite the new president’s complaints during his campaign that there were too many of them.
It could also end up overtly siding with China, diluting Jakarta’s opposition to its growing presence in the South China Sea. That would lead to tensions with claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam, which oppose China’s huge buildup of military infrastructure, and increasing confrontation.
Prabowo is also courting the US — but it is not clear how much and what kind of engagement Trump would have with Southeast Asia’s largest economy, under what is likely to be a haphazard foreign policy approach.
Prabowo would be wise to be patient — and remember he does not need to take sides. During the first Trump presidency, Jakarta and Washington shared an underwhelming relationship, something the new leader could improve, given historical military links.
Prabowo should also leverage Indonesia’s strategic importance by continuing to seek economic benefits from China, while pushing back on territorial and sovereignty issues. There is strength in unity; working with partners in ASEAN like Manila and Hanoi would help.
Elevating Jakarta’s strategic partnership with the US without becoming a proxy for US interests in Southeast Asia is possible even in what is likely to be an ill-defined US foreign-policy environment. It would require deft diplomacy, but also a clear message the archipelago is not in anyone’s pocket.
Indonesia’s voice carries weight. For decades, the bedrock of Jakarta’s approach to international affairs has been to pursue a self-reliant and independent foreign policy. Changing that would risk not only the nation’s sovereignty, but also stability across Southeast Asia.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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