World leaders are preparing themselves for a second Donald Trump presidency. Some leaders know more or less where he stands: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy knows that a difficult negotiation process is about to be forced on his country, and the leaders of NATO countries would be well aware of being complacent about US military support with Trump in power.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would likely be feeling relief as the constraints placed on him by the US President Joe Biden administration would finally be released.
However, for President William Lai (賴清德) the calculation is not simple. Trump has surrounded himself with people that have contradictory views on the US role in Taiwan’s defense against a potential Chinese invasion.
For the “US will defend Taiwan” optimists, one could point to Trump’s first term when in December 2016 he accepted a congratulatory phone call from then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) following his election victory.
It was the first time since the US switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China that a president-elect had publicly spoken to a president of Taiwan.
His administration approved numerous arms sales to Taiwan, including a US$1.4 billion package in 2017, the sale of 30 Apache helicopters for US$1.94 billion in 2018 and a US$2.37 billion sale approved in October 2020 which included 100 Boeing-made Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems.
Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act in 2018, and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act in 2020, the former allowing high-level diplomatic engagement to take place between the two countries, the latter aiming to increase the scope of US-Taiwan relations.
Regarding his statements on Taiwan, in an interview this year with the Wall Street Journal, when asked whether he would use force in the case of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, in classic Trump style he said that he would not have to because Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) “respects me and he knows I’m fucking crazy.” He also stated that if China did attempt a move on Taiwan, he would “tax [them] at 150 percent to 200 percent.”
Now we must look at the pessimistic side. Biden somewhat shifted the dial on the US policy of “strategic ambiguity” by explicitly stating five times that he would defend the nation. Trump has yet to say it once in comparison, although this is in line with former presidents.
Other worrying signs include when Trump shortly before the election in an interview on the Joe Rogan Experience podcast said: “You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business … and they want protection.”
This was not the first time Trump has made such accusations, having made similar statements to Bloomberg Businessweek in July, and Fox News in July last year.
It could be that this is just tough talk to strengthen Trump’s leverage to secure good deals from Taiwan regarding the onshoring of semiconductor fabrication to the US, and scare Taiwan into increasing defense spending.
It might also be Trump leaning into the strategic ambiguity policy, but it would certainly sow doubt in the minds of Taiwanese, and confidence in the Chinese leadership.
It should be assumed that for at least the next four years, the US-Taiwan relationship would be deeply transactional.
Yet it is vital to look at those who would be around Trump and have his ear on foreign policy. Therefore, it is natural to look at US vice president-elect, J.D. Vance.
Vance has put strong emphasis on the necessity of the US to defend Taiwan, and prioritize it over Ukraine, stating that many of the weapons that should have gone to Taiwan have instead gone to Ukraine, and US manufacturing is not currently in a position to make up for that deficit.
At first, this might appear excellent for Taiwan, with the incoming vice president showing strong support. However, the main reason Vance gives for this prioritization is almost entirely because of US dependence on Taiwan due to its semiconductors. This indicates a short-term view, with the implicit wish that if or when the US loses its dependency on Taiwan for semiconductors, support could be withdrawn.
From Vance, there is no focus on shared democratic or liberal values or the moral imperative of defending the liberties of 23 million people.
In an interview with Fox News in April last year, incoming US secretary of state Marco Rubio’s stance on Taiwan appeared to match Vance’s, but with an additional aspect.
“If they were to take Taiwan, it’s not just about the small little island off the coast of China … That gives them effective control over all of … East Asia, seventy percent of global commerce. I mean they could literally just shut us down. They can just cramp down and close down our economy, like COVID times fifty. It would be a strategic … a major moment in world history, and not a good one for America,” he said.
He also said the US needs to be focused on building alliances in East Asia, taking a stance that closely resembles the alliance-building policy of the Biden administration.
The pick of Senator Mike Waltz for US national security adviser is seemingly a win for the optimists. Waltz is known for his pro-Taiwan stance, and in his book Hard Truths: Think and Lead Like a Green Beret, he called for the need to accelerate arms sales to Taiwan and a general US shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific.
In May last year, he wrote on the platform then known as Twitter (called X today): “We must learn from Ukraine by addressing the threat of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] and arming Taiwan NOW before it’s too late. That’s why I asked State and DoD officials for a timeline and specifics on how we plan to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities.”
This is certainly positive for Taiwan, but drilling down into the language, one could conclude that Waltz would rather see the US giving weapons to Taiwan to defend itself, rather than the US coming to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. Similar to Trump, the US line on strategic ambiguity is toed, but this is simply in line with pre-Biden administrations.
Trump would likely bring the US to the defense of Taiwan, but it is contingent on Taiwan’s continued role as a fundamental link in global semiconductor manufacturing, and potentially contingent on whether Trump feels that Taiwan is paying enough for its own defense.
This is reflected by Vance, but is balanced somewhat by Rubio, who has been more explicit about Taiwan’s vital role in the world economy beyond merely semiconductor manufacturing. Waltz is similarly hawkish on supporting Taiwan, but in which form is unknown.
The takeaway: Taiwan cannot relax, but the US is unlikely to abandon it; for now it is simply too valuable.
Oliver Ward is a doctoral student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University.
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
When it became clear that the world was entering a new era with a radical change in the US’ global stance in US President Donald Trump’s second term, many in Taiwan were concerned about what this meant for the nation’s defense against China. Instability and disruption are dangerous. Chaos introduces unknowns. There was a sense that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might have a point with its tendency not to trust the US. The world order is certainly changing, but concerns about the implications for Taiwan of this disruption left many blind to how the same forces might also weaken
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
As the new year dawns, Taiwan faces a range of external uncertainties that could impact the safety and prosperity of its people and reverberate in its politics. Here are a few key questions that could spill over into Taiwan in the year ahead. WILL THE AI BUBBLE POP? The global AI boom supported Taiwan’s significant economic expansion in 2025. Taiwan’s economy grew over 7 percent and set records for exports, imports, and trade surplus. There is a brewing debate among investors about whether the AI boom will carry forward into 2026. Skeptics warn that AI-led global equity markets are overvalued and overleveraged
RSS