China on Monday at 5am implemented, unannounced, its Joint Sword-2024B military exercises. At 6pm, it declared the exercises concluded. Beijing said the exercises were a legitimate and necessary action to defend its sovereignty and unity. However, the exercises’ proximity to Taiwan, and the presence of multiple military aircraft, warships and coast guard vessels attracted significant attention. Nations friendly to Taiwan expressed concern, fearing it would harm peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
From the perspective of international law, their legality is questionable. Article 87 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea says that the high seas are open to all states, whether coastal or land-locked. Ships and aircraft are free to navigate international waters. For warships, this includes the right to conduct fleet maneuvers, flight operations, military exercises and so on. However, military exercises must be properly announced “with due regard for the interests of other states” and should not harm the safe operation of other vessels.
Countries also have this freedom within exclusive economic zones, but are still subject to the restrictions. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations says that all countries must declare a temporary warning zone in international waters and airspace to inform other countries of any activities being held in that area.
Countries must announce areas being used for missile testing, artillery drills and related activities through special navigational warnings, navigational bulletins or via the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System. International law does not recognize any country’s right to restrict foreign warships or military aircraft from navigating or flying over areas outside of its territorial sea during peacetime. Although some coastal countries claim to have established so-called “safe zones” outside of their territorial waters to prohibit activity from other countries’ warships and aircraft, this system only exists in wartime.
The primary purposes of military exercises are training, preparedness and testing combat readiness or national response. Formulating pre-emptive emergency plans and examining their efficacy through drills ensures that national defense capabilities can effectively respond to events. They also promote peace and stability. The goal of military exercises should not be to intimidate other countries.
International law does not prohibit countries from conducting military exercises, even during peacetime. However, the exercises must be announced in advance, conducted over a reasonable period and cannot impede international navigation. China’s recent military exercises were not announced in advance and their location involved areas in the Taiwan Strait and waters near important Taiwanese ports, affecting navigation around major international ports and vessels passing through the Strait.
The exercises were designed to intimidate the government, constituting a blatant threat of force and possible infringement of international law. Although the exercises were smaller and shorter than those that followed then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022, the response from other countries has merely been to express serious concern or to emphasize the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait. China’s actions were clearly inconsistent with international practices, but no other nation condemned Beijing for ignoring international norms and laws.
Perhaps this was China’s true intention — to keep the offense minimal and lull other countries into overlooking the threat to international law.
The erosion of international norms regarding military exercises is concerning.
Chiang Huang-chih is a professor of law at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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