In a recent development of the Core Pacific City case, former Dingyue Development Corp (鼎越開發) president Chu Yea-hu (朱亞虎) was found guilty of bribery.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) accepted political donations of NT$300,000 (US$9,328), the statutory maximum campaign contribution, from each of seven employees of Dingyue’s parent company Core Pacific Group (威京集團), for a total of NT$2.1 million.
The payments were made during the few days between the luncheon hosted by Taipei City Councilor Angela Ying (應曉薇) and the issue of an official document by the Taipei Department of Urban Development under former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je’s (柯文哲) administration.
The five staff members who provided dummy accounts for the “donation” pled guilty, but the TPP argued that they were legal campaign contributions.
The key to distinguishing between campaign contributions and a bribe is whether there is a quid pro quo relationship. Quid pro quo literally means “something for something,” and refers to an exchange of goods or services. Bribes are money or improper benefits that a briber gives to a public official in return for an official act or a breach of their official duties. Whether the payment is called a “campaign contribution” is neither here nor there.
In 2010, the Supreme Court determined that the “campaign contributions” former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) received from former TCC Group (台泥集團) chairman Leslie Koo (辜成允) and former CTBC Financial Holding Co vice chairman Jeffrey Koo Jr (辜仲諒) were actually bribes, based on the existence of a quid pro quo relationship. The terms “commission” and “campaign contribution” were merely obfuscations.
In a 2022 case, in which five current and former legislators were found guilty of graft, former New Power Party (NPP) legislator Hsu Yung-ming (徐永明) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Chen Chao-ming (陳超明) said that the payments they received were campaign contributions.
However, a Taipei District Court judgment found that Chen had accepted the bribes based on his official duties.
Former Pacific Distribution Investment Co chairman Lee Heng-lung (李恆隆) contacted Chen’s office director, Liang Wen-yi (梁文一), and handed him NT$500,000 in cash, which was intended as a bribe, and said that he would donate NT$1 million through the company to Chen’s campaign contribution account. After depositing the money into Chen’s account, Lee informed Chen that he had paid a bribe of NT$1 million as a campaign contribution.
In the Taipei District Court ruling, campaign contributions to political parties were considered to be corruption if there was a quid pro quo relationship.
The ruling said that Hsu, a civil servant, was clearly aware that Lee and Kuo Ke-ming (郭克銘), an aide to former Democratic Progressive Party legislator Su Chen-ching (蘇震清), asked Hsu to co-organize a public hearing at Soochow University. Hsu took advantage of his official duty as a legislator and expressed to Lee his intent to take bribes. Lee promised that he would offer up to NT$2 million as a bribe in the form of a campaign contribution.
Chen and Hsu said that the money was a campaign contribution, but the Taipei District Court ruled that there were quid pro quo relations between the money and their official duties, which constituted the crime of bribery for using the powers of their offices to improperly enrich themselves.
Chen was sentenced to seven years and eight months in prison, and Hsu to seven years and four months.
Based on the opinions of the Supreme Court and the Taipei District Court mentioned above, Ko engaged in bribery when he used his official powers as mayor to intervene in the Core Pacific City case, while his party accepted campaign contributions from people linked to Core Pacific Group.
If the individuals who pled guilty to bribery are proven to have had quid pro quo relations with the former mayor, then this constitutes the crime of accepting bribes and breaching one’s official duties.
Huang Di-ying is a lawyer.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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