We are at a dangerous precipice in the Middle East. Former Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass on Wednesday said that it felt like we were at a “turning point” in the region. The New York Times journalist Thomas L. Friedman was more alarmist: It is a “Code Red Time,” he wrote.
Even before Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah and Iran’s vast ballistic missile retaliation, people constantly asked how likely it was that the Middle East would be plunged into a regional war. Now, as then, the short answer is that nobody knows. However, the potential for a wider kinetic conflict has not been greater in decades.
What would a true regional war in the Middle East look like? How might it specifically unfold — in the air, at sea and on land? Would the US inevitably be drawn into the conflict?
In the year since the horrific Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, we have been in an intractable cycle of violence and military escalation between Israel and Iran (and its proxies). The next move in this deadly pas de deux would likely be a strong response by the Israelis to last week’s Iranian missile assault.
Despite the lack of mass casualties, many senior Israeli leaders are vowing — in the words of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — to make Iran “pay for it.” This could include long-range air strikes, roughly more than 1,609km of contested air space, against the most vulnerable elements of Iran’s nuclear program (which is deliberately scattered across that vast nation).
Doing so would require a complex ballet of loading GBU-57 “bunker buster” bombs on adapted F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft and tricky in-flight refueling. The Israelis would have to hit many sites; 21 have been disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including Natanz, Fordow, Arak and Parchin. There are certainly undisclosed locations. Such an aerial assault would require dozens, if not a couple of hundred, aircraft. Some of the nuclear facilities are more than 91m underground.
The air armada would also need dedicated fighter aircraft, such as the F-35, and electronic-warfare jets. Permission to overfly regional countries would not be forthcoming, meaning the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) might have to deal with third-party interference from Syria, Turkey, Iraq or Azerbaijan. Iran’s Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and its Cold War-era MiG-29 and F-14 fighters are not formidable, but would complicate any strikes.
If Israel proceeds with air attacks, the Iranian response would be significant. Hezbollah would undoubtedly be ordered to launch as many surface-to-surface missiles as possible. Perhaps a third of the pre-conflict arsenal of 130,000 had been fired or destroyed by Israel in recent weeks. However, if just half the remaining rockets were sent in waves toward Tel Aviv, Haifa, military installations, Mossad facilities and political centers in Jerusalem, the damage and civilian casualties would be substantial — even given Israel’s strong air defenses.
In addition, an Israeli attack on Iran might cause Hamas to execute the remaining hostages it holds from the Oct. 7 assault. Terrorists could also attempt many isolated attacks inside Israel, such as the killing of seven and the wounding of more than a dozen Israeli civilians early last week in Jaffa. The Houthis in Yemen could also step up their long-range missile attacks.
However, the main threat is a reciprocal Iranian ballistic-missile strike on Israel far more forceful than Tuesday last week’s. An attack with a majority of the 3,000 ballistic missiles in the Iranian inventory would overwhelm Israeli air defenses; the country’s hospitals would be flooded with the wounded. While the quality of Iranian maintenance and targeting is questionable, quantity can make up for a lot of misfires and defects.
Simultaneously, Iran would likely launch drone strikes — staged by Iranian Shiite militias in Syria or western Iraq — at covert Israeli nuclear facilities and at the IDF’s air force. These would be likely coupled with significant cyberattacks.
The Iranian Navy, while hardly a powerhouse, could attack Western shipping and, above all, seek to close the Strait of Hormuz. This would require the use of mines, small speedboats and submarines: Iran has that equipment and routinely trains for this mission. The resulting disruptions in the flow of oil and gas could devastate the global economy.
Significant ground operations are unlikely — at least initially. Iran has one million troops under arms, about two-thirds on active duty. It has a young population of nearly 90 million from which to draw more forces, and can count on a number of militia allies in Syria and Lebanon. Could they mount a ground attack on Israel, likely through southern Iraq and Syria? It would be hard to pull off, but not impossible.
The US would almost certainly be pulled into a full-on war between Israel and Iran. The Israelis would want significant combat support: the highest-grade intelligence from surveillance aircraft and satellites, cyberwar assistance, advanced munitions and aerial refueling.
The Arab states would try to maintain neutrality — although they would, of course, welcome a degradation of Iranian proxies and military capability. Turkey would be a wild card, but probably would not allow either side transit or access to Turkish bases.
In sum, a true regional war between Israel and Iran could crack the global economy, kill tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians, wreak diplomatic chaos and draw Washington into something it very much wants to avoid.
Israel is fully justified in wanting to hit back at Iran. Yet hating your enemies too much can cloud your judgement. Instead of seeking a regional war, Israel should focus on destroying all that it can of Hezbollah; work to establish a peacekeeping force, a cease-fire and a hostage release in Gaza; and continue the show of strength that can deter Iran from further escalation. Code Red in the Middle East, indeed.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
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