We are at a dangerous precipice in the Middle East. Former Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass on Wednesday said that it felt like we were at a “turning point” in the region. The New York Times journalist Thomas L. Friedman was more alarmist: It is a “Code Red Time,” he wrote.
Even before Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah and Iran’s vast ballistic missile retaliation, people constantly asked how likely it was that the Middle East would be plunged into a regional war. Now, as then, the short answer is that nobody knows. However, the potential for a wider kinetic conflict has not been greater in decades.
What would a true regional war in the Middle East look like? How might it specifically unfold — in the air, at sea and on land? Would the US inevitably be drawn into the conflict?
In the year since the horrific Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, we have been in an intractable cycle of violence and military escalation between Israel and Iran (and its proxies). The next move in this deadly pas de deux would likely be a strong response by the Israelis to last week’s Iranian missile assault.
Despite the lack of mass casualties, many senior Israeli leaders are vowing — in the words of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — to make Iran “pay for it.” This could include long-range air strikes, roughly more than 1,609km of contested air space, against the most vulnerable elements of Iran’s nuclear program (which is deliberately scattered across that vast nation).
Doing so would require a complex ballet of loading GBU-57 “bunker buster” bombs on adapted F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft and tricky in-flight refueling. The Israelis would have to hit many sites; 21 have been disclosed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including Natanz, Fordow, Arak and Parchin. There are certainly undisclosed locations. Such an aerial assault would require dozens, if not a couple of hundred, aircraft. Some of the nuclear facilities are more than 91m underground.
The air armada would also need dedicated fighter aircraft, such as the F-35, and electronic-warfare jets. Permission to overfly regional countries would not be forthcoming, meaning the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) might have to deal with third-party interference from Syria, Turkey, Iraq or Azerbaijan. Iran’s Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and its Cold War-era MiG-29 and F-14 fighters are not formidable, but would complicate any strikes.
If Israel proceeds with air attacks, the Iranian response would be significant. Hezbollah would undoubtedly be ordered to launch as many surface-to-surface missiles as possible. Perhaps a third of the pre-conflict arsenal of 130,000 had been fired or destroyed by Israel in recent weeks. However, if just half the remaining rockets were sent in waves toward Tel Aviv, Haifa, military installations, Mossad facilities and political centers in Jerusalem, the damage and civilian casualties would be substantial — even given Israel’s strong air defenses.
In addition, an Israeli attack on Iran might cause Hamas to execute the remaining hostages it holds from the Oct. 7 assault. Terrorists could also attempt many isolated attacks inside Israel, such as the killing of seven and the wounding of more than a dozen Israeli civilians early last week in Jaffa. The Houthis in Yemen could also step up their long-range missile attacks.
However, the main threat is a reciprocal Iranian ballistic-missile strike on Israel far more forceful than Tuesday last week’s. An attack with a majority of the 3,000 ballistic missiles in the Iranian inventory would overwhelm Israeli air defenses; the country’s hospitals would be flooded with the wounded. While the quality of Iranian maintenance and targeting is questionable, quantity can make up for a lot of misfires and defects.
Simultaneously, Iran would likely launch drone strikes — staged by Iranian Shiite militias in Syria or western Iraq — at covert Israeli nuclear facilities and at the IDF’s air force. These would be likely coupled with significant cyberattacks.
The Iranian Navy, while hardly a powerhouse, could attack Western shipping and, above all, seek to close the Strait of Hormuz. This would require the use of mines, small speedboats and submarines: Iran has that equipment and routinely trains for this mission. The resulting disruptions in the flow of oil and gas could devastate the global economy.
Significant ground operations are unlikely — at least initially. Iran has one million troops under arms, about two-thirds on active duty. It has a young population of nearly 90 million from which to draw more forces, and can count on a number of militia allies in Syria and Lebanon. Could they mount a ground attack on Israel, likely through southern Iraq and Syria? It would be hard to pull off, but not impossible.
The US would almost certainly be pulled into a full-on war between Israel and Iran. The Israelis would want significant combat support: the highest-grade intelligence from surveillance aircraft and satellites, cyberwar assistance, advanced munitions and aerial refueling.
The Arab states would try to maintain neutrality — although they would, of course, welcome a degradation of Iranian proxies and military capability. Turkey would be a wild card, but probably would not allow either side transit or access to Turkish bases.
In sum, a true regional war between Israel and Iran could crack the global economy, kill tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians, wreak diplomatic chaos and draw Washington into something it very much wants to avoid.
Israel is fully justified in wanting to hit back at Iran. Yet hating your enemies too much can cloud your judgement. Instead of seeking a regional war, Israel should focus on destroying all that it can of Hezbollah; work to establish a peacekeeping force, a cease-fire and a hostage release in Gaza; and continue the show of strength that can deter Iran from further escalation. Code Red in the Middle East, indeed.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
The recent passing of Taiwanese actress Barbie Hsu (徐熙媛), known to many as “Big S,” due to influenza-induced pneumonia at just 48 years old is a devastating reminder that the flu is not just a seasonal nuisance — it is a serious and potentially fatal illness. Hsu, a beloved actress and cultural icon who shaped the memories of many growing up in Taiwan, should not have died from a preventable disease. Yet her death is part of a larger trend that Taiwan has ignored for too long — our collective underestimation of the flu and our low uptake of the
For Taipei, last year was a particularly dangerous period, with China stepping up coercive pressures on Taiwan amid signs of US President Joe Biden’s cognitive decline, which eventually led his Democratic Party to force him to abandon his re-election campaign. The political drift in the US bred uncertainty in Taiwan and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region about American strategic commitment and resolve. With America deeply involved in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the last thing Washington wanted was a Taiwan Strait contingency, which is why Biden invested in personal diplomacy with China’s dictator Xi Jinping (習近平). The return of
Actress Barbie Hsu (徐熙媛), known affectionately as “Big S,” recently passed away from pneumonia caused by the flu. The Mandarin word for the flu — which translates to “epidemic cold” in English — is misleading. Although the flu tends to spread rapidly and shares similar symptoms with the common cold, its name easily leads people to underestimate its dangers and delay seeking medical treatment. The flu is an acute viral respiratory illness, and there are vaccines to prevent its spread and strengthen immunity. This being the case, the Mandarin word for “influenza” used in Taiwan should be renamed from the misleading
Following a YouTuber’s warning that tens of thousands of Taiwanese have Chinese IDs, the government launched a nationwide probe and announced that it has revoked the Republic of China (Taiwan) citizenship of three Taiwanese who have Chinese IDs. Taiwanese rapper Pa Chiung (八炯) and YouTuber Chen Po-yuan (陳柏源) in December last year released a documentary showing conversations with Chinese “united front” related agency members and warned that there were 100,000 Taiwanese holding Chinese IDs. In the video, a Taiwanese named Lin Jincheng (林金城), who is wanted for fraud in Taiwan and has become the head of the Taiwan Youth Entrepreneurship Park