Recent developments in the Legislative Yuan regarding UN Resolution 2758 are significant and alarming for observers of Taiwan’s democracy. The resolution stipulates that the People’s Republic of China, not the Republic of China (whose government moved to Taiwan in 1949 after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War), would represent China in the UN. While it does not explicitly state Taiwan’s sovereign status, China has consistently interpreted the resolution to mean that Taiwan is part of China.
For years, the West avoided challenging China’s interpretation, reflecting the US’ policy of “strategic ambiguity.” However, with changing geopolitical dynamics — such as the shift to “strategic competition” by the US and its allies — the stakes are being raised for Taiwan’s international standing. The US House of Representatives last year passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, affirming that UN Resolution 2758 does not refer to Taiwan. The Australian Senate and the Dutch House of Representatives also passed similar motions.
This should be good news. However, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) proposed a motion for the three major parties in the Legislative Yuan to issue a joint statement about UN Resolution 2758, lawmakers from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) walked out.
Why would they do that? What does this mean for Taiwan’s democracy? What are the possible courses of action for the DPP government if it seeks to consolidate domestic support in joining the international movement to clarify UN Resolution 2758?
It is impossible to get inside the heads of the KMT and TPP lawmakers. However, some patterns can explain the situation.
The KMT, the party that fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) in 1949, has long promoted a Chinese cultural identity and has regularly endorsed an appeasement approach toward China. The TPP, a relatively new party with a populist rhetoric, often operates with an obstructionist approach.
These patterns resurfaced in the opposition parties’ proposals on the resolution. The KMT’s proposal emphasized “stability in the Taiwan Strait” and downplayed Taiwan’s sovereignty, seemingly toeing the line with Beijing’s demand. The TPP’s proposal called on the Executive Yuan to “seek meaningful participation in international organizations,” but does not make a statement on the resolution itself.
This trend is concerning for Taiwan’s democracy. Since the lawmakers were sworn in May, the opposition parties have used democratic procedures to undermine Taiwan’s national security and democratic institutions.
Many KMT leaders act as collaborators with China, whitewashing China’s vows to annex Taiwan and promoting policies aligned with Beijing’s priorities, some academics said. The KMT and TPP also appear eager to undermine President William Lai’s (賴清德) administration. For example, on the first day of the new legislative session, the two opposition parties sent budget bills back to the Legislative Yuan’s Procedure Committee, causing unnecessary delays and chaos in the government for no reason. (Opposition legislators voted down the Cabinet’s budget bill for the second time on Tuesday, continuing the pattern of procedural delays to undermine the DPP’s governance.) When democratically elected lawmakers use democratic procedures to pass laws that threaten national security or reach dubious resolutions without meaningful bipartisan discussion, it creates a dangerous path toward illiberal democracy.
Given that the KMT and TPP have formed a majority voting bloc, what can the DPP government do to consolidate domestic support for its efforts to unify Taiwan’s voice regarding the resolution? In the short-term, there is little reason to expect changes in the Legislative Yuan’s patterns. However, the administration can do more to popularize and clarify the message that international support for Taiwan is growing. The narrative that Taiwan should reluctantly concede to China’s demands is driven by fear that the US and other Western democracies are not committed to supporting Taiwan. Western countries’ support for Taiwan is indeed contingent on their own national interests, but those interests align with Taiwan’s goal of increased international participation. If the public is made more aware of these shifts in global dynamics, citizens might feel confident in resisting China’s threats and supporting the government’s efforts to clarify the resolution. Unfortunately, the news about the US, Australia and the Netherlands passing motions to support Taiwan’s international participation was not widely broadcast in Taiwan, nor did the stories maintain a long news cycle or stir significant public discourse.
Moving forward, the government should work harder to ensure that these and related news stories reach and engage a broader segment of the public.
Lo Ming-cheng is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis, whose research addresses civil society, political cultures and medical sociology.
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