A joint statement on Monday issued by the foreign ministers of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) members Australia, India, Japan and the US in Tokyo expressed “serious concern” about the situation in the South China Sea. The statement did not mention China by name, but it was regarded as a veiled rebuke to the Chinese Communist Party (CPP), the actor behind illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive (ICAD) behavior in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In a show of brazen projection, Beijing responded by saying that the Quad nations were “creating tension, inciting confrontation and containing the development of other countries.”
Monday’s Quad statement was more muted than the one issued in a communique by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa and Japanese Minister of Defense Minoru Kihara at the “2+2” Japan-US Security Consultative Committee in Tokyo a day earlier. This was probably due to the influence of Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar, who at a separate news conference in Tokyo on Monday emphasized the people-to-people and economic dimensions of the Quad relationship, downplaying the military aspect of security cooperation. He made it clear that the disagreements between India and China were to be dealt with through dialogue, without contributions from any third party. Taiwan, Japan and Philippines are more vulnerable to open aggression and ICAD activities by the CCP than India is, and far more receptive to support from regional allies, the US and the EU.
During Sunday’s “2+2” talks, Blinken and Austin announced the creation of a new military command to oversee all US forces in Japan, in what Austin called a “historic” shift in US-Japan military cooperation. On Tuesday, Blinken and Austin were in Manila, announcing US$500 million in military aid and a further US$128 million for upgrading Philippine bases that the US military has access to.
Behind Beijing’s posture is a perception of its own geopolitical weakness. The CCP, especially with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) at the helm, sees the country bordering a powerful rival in India to the west and dangerously exposed to pro-US countries in the seas to its east, including Taiwan, Japan and Philippines. That is, while Taiwan, Japan, the US and allies are looking at deterrence to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing is concerned with developing deterrence of its own, even though its own actions are exacerbating the need for that deterrence. Xi and the CCP have a complicated relationship with Japan and Taiwan. To see Japan increase its military spending and consolidate its armed forces is not going to assuage their concerns. The announcement of the US’ new military command in Japan can only be expected to increase those jitters. It is true that Beijing is bringing this flurry of military upgrade activity on its own head, but it does not address either the dangerous escalation, or Beijing’s perception of vulnerability that is driving it.
On the threat to Taiwan, it has been said that time is on Xi’s side. With the increasing augmentation of the US-devised latticework of alliances and military preparation surrounding him, and with the EU rearming in response to the Russian threat, Xi himself is likely wondering whether this is true. Taiwan must play its part in this latticework strategy, and the proposal to increase military spending to NT$3 trillion (US$91.36 billion), 2.5 percent of GDP, is a step in the right direction.
However, there is no substitute for dialogue as a means to reducing tensions and stopping mutual escalation in the region. The US, Japan and Philippines at least have access to talks with Beijing. The difficulty is getting the CCP to agree to talk with Taiwan.
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