When it comes to national security and foreign affairs, President William Lai (賴清德) has said he wants to maintain the same policies as his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). Unfortunately, he does not find himself in the same geopolitical circumstances as Tsai during her presidency.
The loss of a legislative majority aside, the regional geopolitical situation is in a continuous state of flux.
Regardless of the perception of the binary nature of the forces that conspire against or with Taiwan — the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the US — the actual situation is far more complex, as encapsulated by many of the participants in this year’s ongoing RIMPAC exercises, the emerging geostrategic alignment between China and Russia, and the renewed friendly relations between Russia and North Korea, complicating an already complex dynamic.
Even if he says he would retain Tsai’s strategies, Lai must acknowledge that the geopolitical ground has shifted under his feet. The CCP might have been holding out for an election result more conducive to its designs; now that it knows that it must deal with at least another four years of a Democratic Progressive Party administration, it has run out of patience. Nothing we have seen since the election provides assurance that Beijing intends to relieve the pressure.
Lai needs to address this situation both internationally and at home, and for this he requires a nimble foreign affairs and national security team with the ability to adjust policy and strategy to meet the ever-changing circumstances. It is not clear to many of Taiwan’s allies, including Washington and Tokyo, that he has that.
There are good reasons for Lai to have chosen Wellington Koo (顧立雄), who has no military background, to be minister of national defense, but some would question whether this was the time to do it. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) is a competent and loyal administrator, but his experience is limited to domestic policies.
An article by Cathy Fang, a policy analyst in the US, published in this paper (“Consistency sacrifices adaptability,” July 13, page 8) brought up many of these concerns. Fang writes that “the sands of time favor Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), not Lai.”
That is far from clear, given the ever-shifting geopolitical situation, and how events might transpire in the coming years or months.
Complicating factors include responses to the CCP’s aggressive behavior toward Taiwan and other regional players, including India, and also the CCP’s domestic problems with a faltering economy and demographic challenges.
That said, other developments could equally work against Taiwan, such as a change in mood in Washington or complications in the event of an invasion attempt, such as North Korea threatening South Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia, or Russian involvement.
Purely in terms of military preparedness, there is no doubt that time favors Xi. This is why Lai needs to re-evaluate the strategy and sense of urgency in Taiwan’s war preparedness, in both the military and civil spheres.
On Wednesday, national security professor Masahiro Matsumura wrote in this paper that Japanese officials have been briefed that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army needs less than a week to invade Taiwan with its amphibious forces. Matsumura writes that “time is running out for Taipei,” that Lai has so far failed to shift his policies to prepare for a full invasion, and that he “does not share the same sense of urgency as Tokyo and Washington.”
This urgency needs to include not just military strategy, but also preparing the public for potential conflict.
Yes, there are complicating factors, but the winds of change could blow in Taiwan’s favor or usher in its demise. Lai must prepare for the latter, not rely on the former.
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