The Yomiuri Shimbun, the newspaper with the largest daily circulation in Japan, on Thursday last week published an article saying that an unidentified high-ranking Japanese official openly spoke of an analysis that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) needs less than a week, not a month, to invade Taiwan with its amphibious forces. Reportedly, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has already been advised of the analysis, which was based on the PLA’s military exercises last summer.
A Yomiuri analysis of unclassified satellite photographs confirmed that the PLA has already begun necessary base repairs and maintenance, and is conducting amphibious operation exercises for “roll-on, roll-off” ships, similar to large ferries.
Additionally, the US’ commitment to defending Taiwan is becoming all the more uncertain due to growing domestic political instability under intensified populist vs globalist strife and, particularly, the rising Trumpian impulse against excessive overseas commitments.
Certainly, the administration of US President Joe Biden seems to have changed the US’ longtime strategy of ambiguity to a policy of defending Taiwan.
However, the shift is only based on congressional testimony in December 2021 by US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner.
This is not a durable policy line that would survive different administrations, in contrast to the Taiwan Relations Act; the US’ and China’s Three Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979 and 1982; and the US House of Representatives’ resolution on the “six assurances” regarding the principles of Taiwan-US relations. These only demand peaceful unification of China and Taiwan, but no commitment to defend Taiwan.
An administration led by former US president and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump would easily cancel out Ratner’s line.
Clearly, time is running out for Taipei. There are growing risks that would depend on China’s gigantic asset bubble bursting, which might compel Beijing to divert growing discontent among the public by attacking Taiwan.
Amid impending existential threats posed by Beijing, Taipei should build its porcupine warfare capabilities to enable it to survive for at least a month until the US armed forces come to its rescue by overcoming the tyranny of distance.
The consensus is that, as seen with the tactics Ukraine used to push back against Russia, Taiwan primarily needs asymmetric warfare capabilities with numerous small, dispersed, mobile, lethal and inexpensive weapons. This is in contrast to high-end platform-based capabilities that would be largely destroyed or neutralized by initial waves of saturated missile attacks and ensuing air raids.
Yet President William Lai (賴清德) has so far failed to swiftly shift policy to prepare for a full invasion. He continues to carry out existing mid-term defense acquisition plans focusing on high-end platforms. Obviously, he does not share the same sense of urgency as Tokyo and Washington.
Indeed, Lai made an impressive inauguration speech on May 20, upholding Taiwan’s de facto independence and democratic creeds. His overall rhetoric was combative, using the set phrases of previous Taiwanese presidents without explicitly referring to Taiwan’s de jure independence. The politically correct speech was effective in enhancing a sense of solidarity between Taiwan and liberal democracies, involving their strong moral support for Taiwan.
However, it also invited a harsh reaction from Beijing, which conducted another invasion rehearsal, followed by its intensified “gray zone” military activities. The new normal can be expected to gradually but significantly exhaust Taiwan’s military preparedness.
Facing such a pinch, Lai chose Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) and National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) to lead national security and foreign policy. Hsiao as Taiwan’s top diplomat in Washington and Wu as a former foreign minister have a track record in value diplomacy focusing on solidarity with US-led liberal democracies. More specifically, both of them have employed skillful political semantics in supporting Kyiv during the Russia’s war in Ukraine, alienating many US military realists who prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine with regard to military aid.
Lai also chose Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍), whose career record is oriented to partisan politics and domestic policies, and Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄), Taiwan’s first defense minister to not have had a military career. They would be very good choices for long-term defense policy under a protracted confrontation, but there are concerns about whether they have the credentials to cope with the current military-strategic pinch.
Lai’s selections were inevitable because his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration is very weak politically, because opposition parties control the Legislative Yuan.
The administration did not have a honeymoon period. From the first day, the tenacious Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has been obstructing and blocking the DPP, while the Taiwan People’s Party has been casting its votes opportunistically.
Consequently, the administration is unlikely to create any meaningful policy initiatives.
Unfortunately, the time for political semantics is rapidly passing, and now is the moment the Lai administration should do its best to unify public opinion, build a common front with opposition parties and build effective asymmetrical warfare capabilities.
If Taiwan does not move swiftly, Washington cannot make necessary war plans, and Japan cannot formulate effective rear and logistical support plans for the US forces.
In the worst-case scenario, Washington and Tokyo might be compelled to give up on rescuing Taiwan due to the rapidly changing Northeast Asian security environment, which is centered on Beijing’s and Moscow’s emerging geostrategic alignment and the recent alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang.
The Japan-US alliance is facing a Korea contingency scenario as the second front and a northern Japan contingency scenario with Russia as the third front, in addition to the Taiwan front.
The clock is ticking. Lai should make a hard realist turn now.
Masahiro Matsumura is professor of international politics and national security in the faculty of law of St Andrew’s University in Osaka and a Taiwan Fellow at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies in Taipei.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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