When I read Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) assistant director for international affairs Howard Shen’s (沈正浩) blatantly panegyric op-ed (“KMT navigates between US, China,” May 1, page 8), I took a deep breath, bit my tongue, and held off responding.
However, after watching the KMT’s continued, destructive power-grab antics in the Legislative Yuan, and its more recent efforts to reclaim stolen state assets, I can no longer hold back.
There are basic questions that the KMT must answer to all Taiwanese. Instead of navigating in tempestuous times, the KMT has rather become a chameleon that changes colors to blend in and hide its true intentions. In short, Shen must answer: “What exactly is the KMT’s end game?”
When founded in 1912, the KMT was anti-Manchu, Han-centric and allegedly pro-democracy. Unfortunately, it never did establish those democratic credentials. Instead it morphed through China’s warlord period and into the Chinese Civil War, which it lost only to become a government-in-exile on Taiwan. There, it imposed decades-long martial law, White Terror and one-party state rule before surrendering to Taiwanese demands for democracy in the 1990s.
Now more than a century since its inception, Shen tries to explain that the KMT is successfully navigating Taiwan’s geopolitical landscape. In this it is “close to the US, friendly with Japan and peaceful with the mainland.” Really?
I present four basic areas for Shen to address and explain the KMT’s position as it allegedly navigates its course.
First, the US, which Shen claims the KMT is “close to,” holds to a “one China policy.” This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “one China principle,” by which it claims sovereignty over Taiwan. Does the KMT adhere to the US’ “one China policy” position, or to the CCP’s “one China principle”?
I would lay odds that the KMT remains in lockstep with the CCP on this, much to the detriment and chagrin of most Taiwanese.This would clearly explain why in 2000 former KMT Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) created the bogus “1992 consensus.” By it, the KMT could shut out Taiwanese input and/or perspective concerning Taiwan’s de facto independence.
Second, as most are aware after reading the actual wording of UN Resolution 2758, it was the “followers of Chiang Kai-shek” and not the “Taiwanese” who were expelled from the UN. Does the KMT identify as said “followers of Chiang” who were thus expelled from the UN? And if so, do they agree that Resolution 2758 says nothing about the Taiwanese who suffered under the KMT’s martial law, etc.?
Does the KMT care about the UN as it “navigates peacefully” with China or is this an attempt to both keep its hand in the game and a grasp on the continent?
Does the KMT oppose UN membership under the name of Taiwan? Or does it dream and hope that the People’s Republic of China will allow it to somehow ride in or participate by riding on its coattails? In the past, the KMT had opposed “two Chinas” in the UN as there are now two Koreas. My suspicions are that it would certainly oppose membership for an independent Taiwan.
Third, how does the KMT relate to the reality of Taiwan’s de facto independence and its growing Taiwanese identity?
By the Montevideo Convention Taiwan clearly meets all the requirements of a nation, regardless of its name. Furthermore, National Chengchi University’s annual polls on “Changes in Taiwanese and Chinese Identity” from 1992 to the present, point out revealing statistics. The number of those who identify solely as Taiwanese has risen from 17.6 percent to a whopping 61.7 percent. Those who identify as “only Chinese” has dropped from 25.5 percent to a minuscule 2.4 percent, and those who identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese has also slid from 46.4 to 32 percent. Even the percentage of the undecided has fallen from 10.5 to 3.9 percent.
As the people speak, the majority of Taiwanese now identify only as Taiwanese. Even in travel, most Taiwanese whose ancestors were born in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial era prefer to visit the land of fellow democracy, Japan, than that of China. How does this fit with the KMT’s “friendly navigating” with Japan?
Unfortunately, recent reality points to how most KMT leaders favor running off to China to either mend fences or establish ties. Do KMT officials fantasize that they can peacefully bring democracy to China or are they becoming Quislings?
Fourth is the KMT’s stand on transitional justice and its stolen state assets. Shen seemed to leave this out as part of the KMT navigations. However, as its recent moves show, it is obvious that it is utilizing its legislative majority to regain its past assets.
Furthermore, when will the KMT support opening long-sealed state files so that transitional justice and accountability can be exercised? If anything, the KMT seems to be continually navigating away from such responsibilities.
These are four areas where the KMT must provide answers on what exactly its end game is. Is it seeking basic survival? Or privilege? Does the KMT have a clear vision for Taiwan vis-a-vis China? If so, let it articulate it, instead of simply stating that it navigates current geopolitics.
Finally, is Taiwan’s democracy a sine qua non for the KMT? Would the KMT defend democratic and independent Taiwan if the chips were down? Or would it be willing to undermine it if it helped make Taiwan part of the CCP’s expansionist dream of a mythical “one China”?
Shen’s navigating panegyric does not sell. Will the real KMT please stand up?
Jerome Keating is a political commentator.
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