It is election season in the US, and the country’s two main political parties are competing to show who opposes China more.
In what appears to be a lack of urgency in the discussion, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) extension of an invitation to US President Joe Biden for talks was wholly unexpected and seems quite remarkable.
This dialogue not only shows Biden’s playing of the US-China dialogue to his advantage to shore up his electoral base for this year’s elections, but also points to his use of dialogue as a display of his administration’s effective handling of the Chinese Communist Party and US leadership in taking charge of regional developments.
At this critical juncture, American Institute in Taiwan Chairwoman Laura Rosenberger’s visit to Taiwan is of great importance. She met first with president-elect William Lai (賴清德) and vice president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), and later with Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia (夏立言) and Taiwan People’s Party Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲).
As these meetings were taking place, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was visiting China. The Ministry of National Defense canceled its scheduled military exercises in the waters around Kinmen.
Russia’s war on Ukraine and Israel’s fight against Hamas are ongoing. Due to Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian embassy in Syria, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has bolstered security in the South China Sea with joint military exercises with the US, Japan and Australia.
Looking holistically at the state of events, defense analysts are predicting that China might risk incurring sanctions over possible interference by trying to “solve” geopolitical issues with Taiwan and the Philippines in one fell swoop.
With the US elections not too far off, should a conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, drawing Japan and South Korea into the fold, the situation could take a turn for the worse and be more dire than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war.
The US is actively seeking communication with China to prevent a conflict in the Strait. However, this by no means indicates that the situation is completely calm. Lai’s upcoming May 20 inaugural speech and the Philippines’ moves in the South China Sea could be key factors that influence regional security.
Meanwhile, news of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan to visit China next month adds an ominous variable in the three-party relations between the US, China and Russia. After all, Putin tends to favor former US president Donald Trump over Biden.
Taiwan should consider embedding itself alongside India in the Indo-Pacific strategy and deepen its cooperation with the South Asian nation.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to raise India’s profile by making it the world’s third-largest economy by 2030 and develop the nation into one of the world’s top five producers of semiconductors.
India declined to join China’s regional trade group — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — showing that New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy is one which clearly delineates its relationship with Beijing and creates an Indo-Pacific supply chain that is decoupled from China.
Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy shows the normalized pacing of Taiwan and India’s relationship and is accelerating toward a “sprinting phase.”
Embedding Taiwan within the Indo-Pacific strategy narrative, its ties with India must go hand in hand and launch the start of a new chapter in relations.
Lin Hsiao-chen is an associate professor in Tamkang University’s School of Strategic Studies and an International Commission of Jurists researcher focused on the Supreme Court of India.
Translated by Tim Smith
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