On Feb. 17, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency launched an H3 rocket from Tanegashima Space Center, signifying the retirement of the H-IIA rockets that the agency had used for more than 20 years. The move has greatly boosted Japan’s confidence and vision in developing new space projects.
The launch has two implications:
First, the design of the H3 reduces the cost of launching rockets from approximately ￥10 billion (US$66.5 million) for the H-IIA to ￥5 billion, indicating that Japan has reached a milestone in encouraging private use of rockets and satellite launches.
Japan is one of the few democratic countries in East Asia with facilities such as the two launch sites is has at the space center at the southern end of Tanegashima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture.
Most of Taiwan’s satellites are launched from the US, but with the success of Japan’s H3 launch and given Taipei’s friendship with Tokyo, Taiwan’s choice of partners for satellite launches could be expanded. Through the private sector or government collaboration, Taiwan and Japan can work together to reduce the cost of launches and boost satellite data exchange security.
Second, in addition to passing the Basic Space Act in 2008, Japan has also passed the Space Activities Act and the Satellite Telemetry Act since 2016. The former is to promote private participation in new business opportunities in space and establish new start-up industries, while the latter is to prevent private companies from obtaining high-definition images that could be leaked to enemy nations, safeguarding the security of the country and its allies.
Japan passed the Space Resources Act in 2021, allowing private-sector entities to participate in space exploration and obtain corporate development rights. There are opportunity due to Japan’s participation in the US’ moon program and planned Mars program.
Given the vast resources in space, Japan has begun to release some of its government-owned technologies and licenses to create business opportunities through public-private cooperation.
In other words, Japan could create more business opportunities as restrictions ease and new space-related systems emerge.
The systemic changes would give Japan a more flexible approach to pursue national interests and stimulate the private sector to develop space industries, which can be a reference for Taiwan’s space development.
Taiwan passed the Space Development Act (太空發展法) in 2021, set up the Syuhai launch site in Pingtung County’s Mudan Township (牡丹) in 2022 and made the Taiwan Space Agency an independent entity last year. The changes are intended to make space a strategic industry.
Using Japan’s space development as a guide, Taiwan can draw lessons from its legislative moves, regulatory loosening and private participation incentives. Taipei can also extend exchanges with Japan through “space diplomacy” — increasing dialogue on the economy, trade, security and technology.
Cheng Tzu-chen is a professor in Chinese Culture University’s Department of Political Science.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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