Since last month’s general election results, domestic and international observers have grown more pessimistic about the development of cross-strait relations.
Then came the halting of tariff cuts for some of the items under the Economic Framework Agreement (ECFA), Nauru’s cutting of diplomatic ties, China’s rerouting of the M503 flight path, the suspension of travel tour groups to China, the escalation of maritime controversies around Kinmen and China’s Xiamen, the Chinese coast guard boarding and inspecting a Taiwanese sightseeing boat and Chinese coast guard vessels intruding into Kinmen’s waters.
Cross-strait chain reactions of provocation and response is adding fuel to the fire and is a harbinger of maritime security issues in the Taiwan Strait entering a period of instability and turmoil.
The past two years have seen mutual suspicion erode mutual trust and enmity taint friendly intentions.
A few incidents have occurred within the 5km stretch of water separating Kinmen and China’s Xiamen recently.
Last week, Taiwan’s coast guard pursued a Chinese speedboat that had entered Kinmen’s waters, which led to the death of two Chinese when their boat capsized.
Two days after this incident, China’s coast guard boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing boat to conduct a search. The tour boat had entered restricted waters and was a surveillance ship, the coast guard said, denying Taiwan’s sovereignty and jurisdiction through its conduct.
It is not only officials on both sides lobbing accusations at each other; Internet users are trading fierce barbs as well.
Taiwan is emphasizing that the law must be enforced for vessels crossing its maritime borders, but China is saying that the waters around Xiamen and Kinmen are part of China’s traditional fishing grounds and that no such restricted waters exist.
These maritime incidents have become a “hot search” on the Chinese microblogging Web site Weibo, with some Chinese Internet users demanding that “shed blood be repaid with blood.”
We must not show weakness, some Taiwanese said, urging “double payback” through the searching of Chinese ships.
On the other hand, Taiwanese and Chinese officials are obviously maintaining quite a bit of control and composure amid the thick and acrid smoke of stoked nationalism.
Contrary to the slow buildup of enmity between Beijing and Taipei, Kinmen and Xiamen seem to be marching to the beat of their own drums.
The people of Xiamen and Kinmen have a familial relationship.
China has supplied Kinmen with water for several years and there have been direct travel and services between China and Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu for a long time.
The Chinese and Taiwanese coast guards near Kinmen even hold joint rescue drills.
In 1990, an agreement to use pragmatic and humane means of settling differences and resolving conflicts was signed.
The Kinmen Agreement (金門協議) could be considered as a basis for the establishment of cross-strait consultative mechanisms.
Small sparks can start massive forest fires and butterfly effects should be avoided.
Taiwan has released the surviving fishers and provided humanitarian assistance to the families of the two men who drowned.
Although tensions might not immediately ease, a focus on crisis management is slowly emerging.
At present, we have to quickly deal with the matter and authorize a meeting between the representatives from Kinmen County and China’s Red Cross.
Kinmen and Xiamen (or Fujian Province in general) share a long-standing friendly relationship — far less problematic than the Mainland Affairs Council and the Straits Exchange Foundation.
Based on long-standing cooperation, the two cities obviously have an advantage in being able to talk things over.
Under their traditional friendship and amity, even though Kinmen recognizes the so-called “1992 Consensus,” both sides could “frog leap” several pre-existing hurdles, find the greatest common denominator and settle matters.
Through a spirit of shared humanity, offering condolences to the victims and involving officials from both sides, a small investigation team could be formed.
Using objectivity, science, and a fair and just attitude to clarify the facts would be sufficient to continue.
Furthermore, policymakers should reflect on the incident’s causes and deeper connotations.
Previous incidents include the Min Ping Yu No. 5540 incident, defense personnel on outlying islands shooting at Chinese fishers as well as the accidental shelling of Xiamen by an artillery unit on Little Kinmen Island.
Considering the atmosphere between the two sides during those incidents, how would it be possible to de-escalate more serious issues?
Out of all of Taiwan’s government agencies and their relationships with China, the one between Kinmen and China is the friendliest.
However, even with tight-knit friendly ties, Taiwan and China’s coast guards could set off secondary alarms within and outside the narrow waters shared between Kinmen and Xiamen due to enforcement activities.
If there could “be a problem” in the waters around Kinmen, then what does that say about the security of the waters around Taiwan’s territory?
If there could be “an incident” because of Taiwanese Coast Guard enforcement, then is it possible for everything to run smoothly in other policy domains?
A more important question to ask is: “Do we have good and suitable crisis management mechanisms in place?”
There is no lack of small incidents between the two sides of the strait.
Taiwan is isolated in the western Pacific and is oceans away from the US and Europe, whereas China is just a short distance away.
It is often said that “close neighbors are better than distant relatives.”
Taiwan, however, has cast off its nearby relative’s common culture and embraced faraway neighbors who prioritize themselves and whose words and actions are unreliable.
A strategist offering common sense advice would say that if there is no balance between a nation’s means and ends, then security risks would sharply rise.
When faced with increased security risks, threats and challenges, Taiwan needs to act benevolently toward its people, possess insight and have brave and wise leadership.
Is it possible that this expectation would be realized?
Richard Hu is the deputy director of National Chengchi University’s Taiwan Center for Security Studies.
Translated by Tim Smith
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