On Wednesday afternoon last week, a Chinese speedboat left Weitou in China’s Fujian Province, crossing the maritime border into Kinmen County, where those aboard began to fish in the waters off Beiding Islet (北碇島). When the coast guard dispatched a patrol boat for an inspection, the speedboat fled, leading to a high-speed chase.
Unfortunately, the fleeing vessel capsized, sending four Chinese into the water, and two of them were unable to be resuscitated upon being sent to hospital.
Despite the coast guard personnel acting quickly to save them from drowning, this incident quickly touched a sensitive cross-strait political nerve.
However, as the incident involved Chinese citizens and Taiwanese law enforcement units without leading to a naval confrontation, there is little likelihood of this escalating into a conflict in the short term.
In 2022, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) said in a public statement that “the waters of the Taiwan Strait extend from both coasts of the strait and meet at the median line. In order, they are China’s internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone.”
His statement has become an important part of discourse for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategy in the Taiwan Strait.
Since Wang’s statement, the CCP has been carrying out displays of jurisdictional conduct in an attempt to show the international community that it does not affirm the status of Taipei’s exercise of jurisdiction over its own respective maritime territory in the Taiwan Strait.
Over the past few years, China’s coast guard has increased the frequency of its activities in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in neighboring waters.
It has gradually expanded its activities to the waters off Taiwan’s east and southwest coasts.
These activities show the gradual consolidation of China’s claim of sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait, and its attempt to salami slice away Taiwan’s sovereignty and rights.
The CCP could use the speedboat accident to bolster its claim to sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait. For example, it could attempt to refuse searches or patrols by the Taiwanese coast guard in the name of protecting Chinese fisheries, refusing to acknowledge the jurisdiction of Taipei’s investigations and searches when patrol vessels are dispatched.
Apart from this, the CCP could also use other means to tighten its grip over the Taiwan Strait, such as demanding the release of arrested Chinese citizens or by mobilizing personnel to exert pressure on Taiwanese.
Although the CCP’s goal in using maritime militia masquerading as fishers for harassment is to establish a favorable “status quo” that further supports its doctrine, if an accident occurs under a high-stakes situation, leading to damaged vessels or loss of life or limb, the authorities on both sides of the Strait could rapidly escalate the matter. As such, Taiwan needs to be prudent in its responses to avoid such a situation spiraling out of control.
The CCP’s use of lawfare in the Taiwan Strait is not a merely verbalized thing — it is a series of realized “gray zone” activities.
Last week’s accident could become an opportunity for the CCP to keep pushing its territorial claims.
Taipei must remain vigilant in its response, and defend its sovereignty and rights in the Taiwan Strait.
Gong Lin-dong is a research fellow who focuses on the Chinese Communist Party.
Translated by Tim Smith
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