After the presidential election, how should Taiwanese interpret the results? What kind of message do they have for the parties?
First, the Democratic Progressive Party has lost half of the young people’s votes that used to be in its pockets. If it does not make up for this loss, then elections would become more difficult to win.
The government’s COVID-19 pandemic response has garnered international recognition, the GDP has surpassed that of South Korea and is catching up with Japan, the TAIEX has repeatedly hit record highs and has remained above 10,000 points, and the unemployment rate is low. So why are young people indifferent to such achievements, and why can these accomplishments not effectively transform into votes?
If in the next four years president-elect William Lai (賴清德) fails to change his serious persona and show his easygoing, friendly and humorous side, he would push away young voters, who want a leader who appears natural and spontaneous.
For the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), over time voters on the left and right of the political spectrum have been moving toward the center. That means that the number of “blue fighters” led by KMT vice presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康), as well as the number of diehard supporters in traditional military dependents’ villages, is likely to decline, and their political influence would in turn diminish.
If the KMT’s “blue intellectuals,” led by former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), cannot draw a line between themselves and the Chinese Communist Party, and if they still cannot fix their hate speech issues, they would absolutely be a bomb for the party in presidential polls. They would only be able to reassure those already in their comfort zones. As a result, the KMT would be unable to develop new sources of voters and could only rely of their support base. Thus, it might slip further away from regaining the presidential office.
As for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), just look toward the New Party and the People First Party that departed from the KMT. They both went into a bubble quickly after a short period of prosperity. Also, look at how Ma once saved the KMT, but ended up becoming a hindrance for it in the elections. These all serve as lessons for the TPP.
TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) started his political career with the slogan of “knocking down the high wall.” Ironically, after he was elected Taipei mayor, he actually built a high wall, instead of knocking one down, when handling the so-called “five major corruptions.” His running mate in the presidential election, TPP Legislator Cynthia Wu (吳欣盈), is a third-generation member of a large Taiwanese conglomerate.
After eight years as Taipei mayor, he won the fewest votes among the three presidential candidates on Jan. 13. Obviously, as long as the voters follow his own saying that “you can only fool me once,” Ko, who is only capable of boasting unabashedly and telling lies, would soon be seen through by middle-aged and elderly voters who have more experience with politicians. By that time, he would have lost his presidential stage.
Ko can only deceive young people who are less experienced and know little about the dangers of the human heart. If the TPP cannot get out of his control as soon as possible, then the party’s future would solely lie in Ko himself.
Chang Kuo-tsai is a retired National Hsinchu University of Education associate professor.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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