The highly anticipated election season drew to a close on Saturday, with Taiwanese giving their vote of confidence to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for a historic third term. Winning with a decisive 40.05 percent of the vote, William Lai (賴清德) is on track to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) foreign and domestic policies.
International media watched the election with keen interest, flocking to Taiwan with more urgency than in previous votes. The international news conference Lai and running mate Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) held days before the election was attended by representatives of 128 media outlets from 28 countries, and many more covered the vote over the weekend.
The narrative was dominated by the promise that this decision would upset the direction of cross-strait relations over the next four years, either toward greater confrontation or cooling tensions. In essence, the message aligns with Beijing’s missive to voters that their choice was between “war or peace.” Beijing’s “troublemaker” designation for Lai has even weaseled its way into some headlines, allowing a foreign power to dictate the Taiwanese president-elect’s image, even before he takes office.
Yet anyone who follows Taiwanese politics and cross-strait relations knows it is not that simple. The DPP might have kept the presidency, but it was largely the fault of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) failing to agree on a united ballot. With a combined 59.95 percent of the vote, the opposition could have carried this election on the promise of a routine transfer of power. The result is not so much a “snub to Beijing” as an indictment of the state of the opposition.
For a better understanding, look to the Legislative Yuan. The DPP lost 10 seats and the majority, while the KMT picked up 14 and the TPP gained three. Without anyone passing the 50 percent threshold, the speaker’s gavel is anyone’s for the taking, and the eight TPP legislators find themselves in a powerful swing vote position. The DPP-led government would find it hard to get anything done with a split legislature, especially one that is determined to impose greater oversight on the executive branch, as the TPP has been emphasizing in these first days following the election.
Lai’s victory was decisive, but voters are clearly not satisfied with every facet of the DPP’s performance. Knowing this, the reaction from China has been muted. No unusual People’s Liberation Army movements have yet been reported by the Ministry of National Defense, and creatively worded statements of condemnation were to be expected. China’s biggest message so far came yesterday with Nauru’s termination of diplomatic relations, leaving Taiwan with only 12 formal diplomatic allies. If such theatrics had a large impact, Taiwanese would not have voted to continue the politics of the past eight years. Instead, Beijing is also waiting to see where this undercurrent of discontent leads, and might be content to see a gridlocked legislature.
At the same time, Taiwan should be proud of what it accomplished this weekend. Watched by the world, it proved that “vibrant democracy” really is an accurate description of the way Taiwanese revel in their hard-won right to vote. Citizens traverse miles and oceans to cast their ballots, staying afterward to see each vote read aloud, one by one, echoed thousands of times across the country. Hours later, both opposition candidates showed what it means to concede promptly and graciously, despite the barbs they traded on the campaign trail and the stakes at play. Their gazes are fixed on the future, debating matters of importance such as legislative reform.
This is to be a huge year for democracy, with nearly half of the world’s population choosing new leaders. As one of the first countries to hold an election this year, Taiwan offers an ideal to aspire to.
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