Much ink has been spilled on the United States’ preferences in Taiwan’s upcoming election. Some pundits have suggested that because Beijing clearly favors Kuomintang presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜), therefore the United States must naturally favor his main opponent, Vice President Lai Ching-te (賴清德). In other words, the enemy of one’s enemy is its friend. Other pundits have suggested that because the United States faces mounting challenges in Europe, the Middle East, and at home, it must wish for Hou Yu-ih to win, because Hou could calm tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Both these theories are wrong.
The reality is much simpler. The Biden administration has decided on a posture of disciplined neutrality in the election. Washington will be prepared to work closely with whomever Taiwan’s people elect. This principled approach is guided by several considerations.
First, the United States respects Taiwan’s democratic system. This system has been tested through three previous transfers of power. Taiwan’s democratic processes are strong, transparent, and rules-based. They afford the Taiwan people the right and responsibility to elect their leaders.
Second, members of the Biden administration recognize they will need to work with whoever Taiwan’s voters elect. They do not know who will win Taiwan’s election. They simply know they will need to build a high-functioning relationship with whoever wins. This imperative is a key factor in Washington’s efforts to uphold impartiality in the electoral process.
Third, there is not much purchase in Washington for viewing Taiwan’s election as either a choice between war and peace or between democracy and autocracy. For those in the United States who follow Taiwan’s election, there is broad acceptance that Taiwan’s voters are fundamentally pragmatic in support of preserving the status quo. This explains why each of Taiwan’s main presidential candidates is vying to be seen as the best choice to uphold the status quo. That is where the votes are.
Fourth, the outcome of this election is likely going to generate power fragmentation in Taiwan’s political system. Taiwan’s president-elect probably will win without a majority of the vote. It also is likely that no party will win a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. This outcome will increase the importance for the United States of maintaining healthy relations with all of Taiwan’s major political parties. There will not be any single strongman or dominant political party. Washington will need to work well with a range of stakeholders.
At a deeper level, Washington’s approach to Taiwan is guided by several key long-term interests, the foremost of which is a desire to uphold peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Successive American administrations have determined that a strong and confident Taiwan is conducive to America’s top interest in preserving peace and stability. They have worked to support Taiwan’s security, its economic dynamism, and its dignity and respect on the world stage. America will want to advance progress along all these lines with the next administration. This is the mainstream view in the United States.
If this piece feels boring, well, then it’s doing its job. That is the point. Washington’s interest is not in being an exciting participant or critical variable in Taiwan’s election outcome. It is in standing back, pushing back on any outside interference by others, giving the people of Taiwan space to decide, and then carrying forward the relationship with whoever they elect.
Beijing has signaled its preference for Hou to win the upcoming election and likely will react visibly if Lai extends the Democratic Progressive Party’s hold on power. Even so, we should interrogate arguments suggesting that any outcome of this election will trigger either conflict or capitulation. The situation is far from either of those extremes and will remain so for as long as the center of gravity in Taiwan’s political system is for preserving and prolonging the cross-Strait status quo.
None of this is meant to diminish the real risks of a military incident or of intensifying Chinese military pressure against Taiwan. Those are real risks that must be handled with firmness and wisdom. Beijing surely does not celebrate the status quo.
Even so, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army remains unready to undertake a complicated campaign to retake Taiwan by force. President Xi (習近平) is exhorting the PLA to accelerate their efforts to build capabilities for such contingencies. And in the meantime, Beijing is pursuing what my Brookings colleague Richard Bush has coined as a campaign of coercion without violence. This campaign includes displays of military force combined with information, cyber, economic, and diplomatic efforts to wear down the confidence of the people of Taiwan in their future. This is the most proximate challenge facing Taiwan right now.
In other words, there will be no shortage of challenges for Taiwan’s next leader to tackle. He will have a willing partner in the United States for finding ways to support Taiwan’s security, prosperity, and dignity, no matter who the Taiwan people elect.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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