President Tsai Ying-wen (蔡英文) in her New Year’s Day news conference on Monday warned that pro-China politicians’ assertions that the so-called “1992 consensus” would protect the Republic of China (ROC) put the nation’s sovereignty at risk.
The “1992 consensus” was a tacit understanding between the then-Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government and the Chinese government. The KMT has consistently presented it as an acknowledgment by both sides that there is only “one China,” with each side free to interpret what “China” means.
The KMT and its candidates in next week’s elections — including its presidential candidate, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜) — have said that the “consensus” is the foundation for dialogue with China to avoid war, echoing Beijing’s cognitive warfare attempts to equate the election as a choice between peace and war, as it seeks to sway voters toward pro-China candidates and link the ROC Constitution with the “1992 consensus” to promote the “one China” concept.
However, at a symposium last week commemorating the 130th anniversary of the birth of Mao Zedong (毛澤東), Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) vowed to resolutely prevent anyone from “splitting Taiwan from China.” In his New Year’s address, Xi again called China’s “reunification” with Taiwan “inevitable.” The speech — apparently intended to influence Taiwan’s elections with a stronger tone than his statements last year — was a new phrasing of his 2019 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” The two sides of the Taiwan Strait reached the “1992 consensus” to seek unification based on Beijing’s “one China principle,” and the “one country, two systems” formula provides a basis on which that could be achieved, he said. Xi’s hegemonic remarks make clear that “one China” means the People’s Republic of China, with no room for the KMT’s interpretation that “one China” means the ROC.
Tsai said that the “consensus” was made up after 2000 and warned that the KMT’s attempt to link it to the Constitution would trap Taiwan.
The KMT’s promotion of the “consensus” and “one China” would be seen globally as acceptance of China’s claim over Taiwan, giving the mistaken impression that Taiwanese are willing to be subordinate to China, just like in Hong Kong and Macau.
However, most Taiwanese reject the “1992 consensus.” After Xi asserted his definition in 2019, a survey showed that more than 80 percent of Taiwanese disagreed with China’s proposed “one country, two systems” framework, 75 percent were against the “1992 consensus” based on the “one China principle” and more than 50 percent said that the “consensus” does not exist. Moreover, a survey conducted at about the time former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was visiting China last year showed that more than half of Taiwanese do not accept the KMT’s version of the “consensus,” with less than 30 percent saying that it would protect Taiwan from a hypothetical Chinese invasion.
Despite China’s aggression, Tsai and Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Vice President William Lai (賴清德) have shown goodwill, vowing to maintain the “status quo” and peace in the Taiwan Strait, while calling for Taipei and Beijing to seek “long-term peaceful coexistence.” On Saturday next week, Taiwanese should make the wise choice to further ensure that cross-strait ties are based on freedom and equality, without sacrificing the nation’s sovereignty or dignity.
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