China-ASEAN relations have acquired a tenuous stability and economic engagement continues unabated. However, ASEAN’s desire for strategic autonomy is being wooed by other partners and groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
Despite Indonesia’s proactive leadership of ASEAN negotiations with China regarding the code of conduct in the South China Sea, differences remain. ASEAN insists on adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, while China wants to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake with ASEAN characteristics.
This is unacceptable to other nations, notably Quad members, which resist giving China control of the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, Japan remains concerned with Chinese intrusions around the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台, known in Japan as the Senkakus), and there are heightened tensions around Taiwan, where the US has challenged Chinese intentions.
This has led to the US, Japan and South Korea engaging more where ASEAN is concerned.
ASEAN would like to avoid big power rivalry in the region, including involving Taiwan, but China is not helping. Chinese blockades of Philippine outposts, shoals and islands have flared up. Chinese fishing fleets, coast guard vessels and quasi-armed fishing boats have all intruded into the Philippine exclusive economic zone and prevented the Philippines from accessing its own outposts, leading to the Philippines strengthening its partnership with the US and Japan, and also looking for other like-minded partners such as India.
Some see the Philippines as an isolated response by an ASEAN member, while others see it as the beginning of a trend. Vietnam and Indonesia continue to keep quiet, but if the intrusions become frequent, then challenges would be felt domestically, particularly in Indonesia, which is now going into election season.
Another aspect is that the summit between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on the sidelines of APEC in San Francisco last month re-established high-level communications, but did not set the relationship right.
The US will challenge and compete with China economically and ideologically, but avoid confrontation. China wants the US to stop its confrontational attitude over Taiwan and to stop enticing nations in the Indo-Pacific region into staying independent from Chinese partnerships.
China does not want its developmental path to economic growth, its own manner of engaging nations through the Belt and Road Initiative or its political system to be challenged. It also wants an end to decoupling efforts.
The China-US contentious relationship is to continue and in its wake the Quad would continue to work to keep the shipping lanes in the South China Sea open. The only way in which these engagements can become more congenial is if China becomes less aggressive and unilateral. This is unlikely to happen.
A Quad summit next month is to review the current state of play and would have to conclude that Chinese conduct in the Indo-Pacific region is a matter of concern, and needs to be continuously monitored and challenged.
The relationship between the Quad and ASEAN will then see incremental engagement.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo as ASEAN chair had said that the Quad and Australia’s Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS) with the UK and the US are not rivals of ASEAN. ASEAN has multilateral engagement with China, Japan and South Korea under the ASEAN-Plus Three grouping, and if the Quad agenda for functional cooperation with ASEAN continues then it is likely that ASEAN-Quad engagement could emerge.
This year, the Quad focused on ASEAN and the South Pacific as areas where Chinese interests would be challenged through technology, economic and functional cooperation, keeping military challenges to the side so that ASEAN in particular is assuaged. Individual ASEAN members have started various levels of cooperation with Quad nations, either bilaterally or multilaterally. This is part of ASEAN’s policy of strategic autonomy.
Indonesia held the first ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum in September. All ASEAN leaders, with the exception of Myanmar’s, were present, showing the greater acceptance by ASEAN of the Indo-Pacific concept, which the Chinese have never been comfortable with.
During the year, China held another maritime exercise with ASEAN, aimed at enhancing capabilities in counterterrorism and maritime security between China and five ASEAN members. This helps ASEAN balance its outlook, but it looks odd given that the main problem in the South China Sea emanates from China, which refuses to conclude a balanced code of conduct.
This year’s China-ASEAN summit had a sharper edge because then-Chinese premier Li Keqiang (李克強) told ASEAN members that they should not look to take sides and start a new cold war.
ASEAN has always been keen to avoid taking sides, big power rivalries or war, but it has realized that China is responsible for the emergence of new confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region.
Economically speaking, China and ASEAN have remained close partners and Beijing needs to work with ASEAN more diligently next year. Laos, as the ASEAN chair, is less likely to take up issues which would cause unease for China. It is also unlikely to take initiatives that would bolster ASEAN’s position in any way.
However, individual ASEAN members are undergoing change. Myanmar is in the throes of a crisis which neither ASEAN nor China has control over. Thailand has a new government, which is now reassessing its foreign policy. The Philippines has decided to challenge Chinese aggression.
Indonesia is going through a seminal change as elections come in February and a change of government takes place by October. While there is no doubt that the Indonesia-China economic relationship would remain good, a new presidency could see nuanced changes in how it deals with China strategically.
Cambodia will remain a close Chinese ally, but under new Prime Minister Hun Manet, it might like to seek more economic opportunities.
There are many drummers beating around the Indo-Pacific region, and the Chinese drumming is not the only beat that is being heard.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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