Great power competition is expected to only continue to increase frictions along geopolitical fault lines. Caught between China and the US, no other regional organization recognizes this more acutely than ASEAN. Concerns have been raised as to how the organization representing 650 million people is expected to navigate the tense waters of this strategic region as the frequency of crises becomes more recurrent.
Singapore Institute of International Affairs chairman Simon Tay (戴尚志), during his opening address for the 15th ASEAN & Asia Forum, said that the world was heading into a “concrisis,” a convergence of crises and global issues.
VISION
The concept of “ASEAN centrality” has been championed by the organization to maintain cohesion and identify the interests that external powers have in the region. Holding this year’s chairmanship, Indonesia has expressed its vision of ASEAN as the “epicentrum of growth.” Jakarta aims to “strengthen economic recovery and make Southeast Asia the world’s engine of sustainable growth.”
However, climate change, inequality and the breakdown of multilateralism pose existential and persistent challenges to the region.
“ASEAN centrality is not a panacea,” ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn said, but it is something that can be used to help deal with current and upcoming challenges. Kao said that ASEAN cannot afford to take sides or pay lip service to the great powers.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The problem remains that external powers might misunderstand the interests of ASEAN states. Former Vietnamese deputy minister of foreign affairs and former ambassador to the US Pham Quang Vinh said that when approached by Washington to join the Administration of US President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, the Vietnamese government was initially reluctant, as it was concerned about how China would react toward it.
In the past years, ASEAN has been tested internally and externally. The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has revealed the organization’s limitations in resolving the crisis, as “non-interference” is a fundamental principle of the organization. China’s growing influence in member states such as Cambodia also weakened ASEAN’s solidarity when the organization failed to issue a joint statement on the South China Sea when Phnom Penh refused to mention the issue.
DIALOGUE
Despite the challenges that Southeast Asian nations face, ASEAN continues to matter as it remains the key platform for regional cooperation. At the recent 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta, the organization’s 11 key dialogue partners, including the US, China and Russia, were in attendance.
That states locked in confrontation could congregate under ASEAN’s auspices demonstrates the organization’s significance at a time when the prospect of engagement between belligerent great powers continues to fade.
Until a new equilibrium in international politics is achieved and solutions to our collective existential threats are found, crisis is expected to continue to define the decades ahead of us.
In the forum’s final keynote speech, Singaporean Minister of Health Ong Ye Kung (王乙康) gave his definition of crises: “They are painful and destructive, but they pass.”
Nigel Li is a specialist on Eurasia and Russian foreign policy. He reports from Singapore.
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