An army officer and a suspected spy were arrested and questioned on Monday, while four others involved in the case were released on bail, the High Prosecutors’ Office said.
Lawyer and former prosecutor Weng Wei-lun (翁偉倫) said that the case differs from previous espionage cases, which primarily involved retired military personnel who were recruited abroad and who accepted gifts in exchange for information. Beijing is increasingly “reaching into Taiwan” and targeting active military officers, he said.
The situation might reveal that Beijing is not fully confident in its ability to occupy Taiwan militarily, and wants to gain a better grasp of Taiwan’s missile installations and other defensive capabilities to gain an advantage in a potential military conflict. Conversely, this also means that China could be preparing for conflict.
This possibility is supported by the increasing frequency and scope of China’s military drills in and around the Taiwan Strait in recent years. Given the increasing risk of a military conflict with China, it is imperative that no leniency be shown in espionage cases — particularly those involving members of the armed forces or the government.
Japan’s Nikkei newspaper on Feb. 28 quoted an anonymous source as saying that up to 90 percent of Taiwan’s military retirees have spent time in China, where they provided information to Beijing in exchange for money. The Ministry of National Defense at the time denied the report, but even if the number of traitorous retirees were half as many as claimed, the threat to military secrets would still be daunting.
If money is the main motivator for military retirees to commit treason, then active military personnel would likely be similarly motivated to commit such acts. One recent case involved a suspected spy who cased pawnshops frequented by military personnel to identify those with money problems who would be most susceptible to recruitment for espionage.
Clearly, Taiwan would be unable to compete with China using money to ensure the loyalty of military personnel, so the alternative is to make the punishment for spying severe enough to be a deterrent.
Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research’s Division of Defense Strategy and Resources, in May said that military spies in Taiwan are given an average prison sentence of 18 months, compared with the average sentence of 19 years for similar offenses in other democracies.
Some people found guilty of endangering the nation have even been given suspended sentences, Deputy Minister of Justice Tsai Pi-chung (蔡碧仲) said.
CTBC Business School Department of Business and Economic Law associate professor Chen Tsung-chien (陳重見) suggested that the problem might stem from Taiwanese judges’ poor understanding of national security issues, and suggested that a specialized court should try all national security cases.
Regardless of how cases are tried, Taiwan needs legislation that adequately defines espionage-related offenses, and that stipulates heavy mandatory sentences for all violations.
Those aspiring to commit treason have little to lose and much to gain. If the Chinese government offers members of Taiwan’s armed forces significant compensation for spying, and puts the money into an account in China where it is beyond the reach of Taiwan’s judiciary, then little reason exists for someone not to risk one or two years in prison knowing they have a great deal of wealth waiting for them when they get out.
If prospective traitors were facing the possibility of 10 to 20 years in prison and of being permanently barred from leaving Taiwan, as well as close financial scrutiny, they would be much less motivated to spy for China and risk being caught.
The government needs to be heavy-handed in dealing with spies before it is too late, or it risks the entire military becoming compromised in the face of growing efforts by China to infiltrate Taiwan.
China’s supreme objective in a war across the Taiwan Strait is to incorporate Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic. It follows, therefore, that international recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence is a consummation that China’s leaders devoutly wish to avoid. By the same token, an American strategy to deny China that objective would complicate Beijing’s calculus and deter large-scale hostilities. For decades, China has cautioned “independence means war.” The opposite is also true: “war means independence.” A comprehensive strategy of denial would guarantee an outcome of de jure independence for Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion or
A recent Taipei Times editorial (“A targeted bilingual policy,” March 12, page 8) questioned how the Ministry of Education can justify spending NT$151 million (US$4.74 million) when the spotlighted achievements are English speech competitions and campus tours. It is a fair question, but it focuses on the wrong issue. The problem is not last year’s outcomes failing to meet the bilingual education vision; the issue is that the ministry has abandoned the program that originally justified such a large expenditure. In the early years of Bilingual 2030, the ministry’s K-12 Administration promoted the Bilingual Instruction in Select Domains Program (部分領域課程雙語教學實施計畫).
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) earlier this month said it is necessary for her to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and it would be a “huge boost” to the party’s local election results in November, but many KMT members have expressed different opinions, indicating a struggle between different groups in the party. Since Cheng was elected as party chairwoman in October last year, she has repeatedly expressed support for increased exchanges with China, saying that it would bring peace and prosperity to Taiwan, and that a meeting with Xi in Beijing takes priority over meeting
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman for maritime affairs Rogelio Villanueva on Monday said that Manila’s claims in the South China Sea are backed by international law. Villanueva was responding to a social media post by the Chinese embassy alleging that a former Philippine ambassador in 1990 had written a letter to a German radio operator stating that the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島) did not fall within Manila’s territory. “Sovereignty is not merely claimed, it is exercised,” Villanueva said. The Philippines won a landmark case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 that found China’s sweeping claim of sovereignty in
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