Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been going on for nearly a year and a half. At the end of last year Ukraine started building the world’s first “naval fleet of drones” to counter Russia’s Black Sea fleet, news reports said. One of Ukraine’s maritime drones — an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) that resembles a speedboat — is 5.5m long and weighs one tonne. It has an operational radius of up to 400km and can operate autonomously for up to 60 hours. It can carry a combat load of up to 200kg and has a maximum speed of 80kph. The USV’s main functions include long-range maritime reconnaissance and coastal surveillance, escorting and supporting Ukraine’s conventional fleet and countering amphibious operations, among others. This Ukrainian-developed USV is believed to be the weapon that badly damaged the Kerch Bridge in Crimea on July 17, effectively blocking Russia’s logistical supply line, and had attacked the Crimean Black Sea port of Sevastopol the previous day.
Taiwan would do well to learn from this experience. To be ready for a war across the Taiwan Strait, the nation should develop a sea-drone fleet that is maneuverable, fast, cheap and effective. In recent years there have been several incidents of Chinese illegally crossing over to Taiwan on simple rubber dinghies. As well as favorable sea conditions and good luck, another reason they managed to reach Taiwanese territory is that a dinghy’s low profile on the sea surface makes it hard to detect using electronic devices. For the same reason, USVs have a “stealth” function. Despite their small size, they can be used to hit ships of the People’s Liberation Army Navy as they try to cross the Taiwan Strait, thus giving Taiwan a chance to win decisively outside its own territory.
Taiwan also needs to develop a system that can launch sea-to-air or sea-to-ground missiles from USVs. If China were to invade Taiwan, the first attack waves would destroy more than half of Taiwan’s military airfields, warships, naval harbors and missile bases, as well as a large number of the military personnel stationed at those sites. In such a scenario, easily concealed sea drones and their operators stationed in bunkers might well play a role in turning the tide of the war.
Fang Fu-chuan is an international trader.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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