The Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research recently announced that a delegation from the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies (JFSS) think tank, led by JFSS secretary-general Reiko Nagano, had visited the institute earlier this month.
The delegation included former Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force chief of staff Kiyofumi Iwata, former Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force chief of staff Tomohisa Takei and former Japanese Air Materiel Command commander Oue Sadamasa.
The JFSS announced that next month, it would hold in Tokyo a simulation of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Two simulations have been held since the first in August 2021 and only involved the US and Japan, but the upcoming one would, for the first time, involve Taiwan.
This is significant in that it would be the first unofficial war game simulation between the US, Japan and Taiwan.
A private organization focused on diplomacy and defense strategy, the JFSS also specializes in analyzing international relations and Japanese politics, economy, military and technology as national policies. Composed of retired generals from the Japanese Ministry of Defense and experts from academia, industry and the government, the JFSS has influence and is also important for Taiwan.
Even though Taiwan and Japan do not have official diplomatic relations, on Taiwan’s Reports on Foreign Visits Web site, there have been official reports of the army sending serving military personnel to the institute for exchanges. This is enough to show that the JFSS has not only played the critical role of communicator between Taiwan and Japan, but is also a branch of the Japanese government.
In 2020, the institute published Shattering China’s Ambition to encourage further collaboration between Taiwan and Japan on countering Beijing and to build a shared defense strategy against a bellicose neighbor.
Given that the unofficial war game simulation between the US, Japan and Taiwan would serve as a precursor for official war games, as well as for joint operations and military cooperation, the government should mobilize civil power to support military operations and make preparations as soon as possible.
First, Taiwan needs to establish a hotline for maritime patrols, the navy and air force. As Taiwan’s and Japan’s air defense identification zone and exclusive economic zone overlap to a large extent, both should establish hotlines to deal with emergencies and unexpected scenarios.
Second, Taiwan should emulate the US in reinforcing collaboration between military institutions. As Taiwan’s army and several US military units are now sister troops, and Taiwanese military personnel are often sent to the US for exchanges and training, Taiwan should follow the US’ footsteps and step up collaboration with Japan. As joint military exercises between the US armed forces and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have become common, Taiwan should not lag behind in this respect.
Third, Taiwan should promote civil-military collaborations. By promoting cooperation between Taiwan’s and Japan’s civil-military organizations, such as shooting associations, defense media networks, think tanks and military associations, the two nations can develop stronger ties and solidarity.
As one of the winners of World War II and a former colony of Japan, Taiwan should let go of any residual enmity for Japan during the colonial period and focus on the imminent threat to freedom and democracy from the Chinese Communist Party.
Let us hope for a joint military exercise between Taiwan, Japan and the US to keep China at bay.
Chu-Ke Feng-yun is a university assistant professor. He blogs about military affairs.
Translated by Rita Wang
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