Cross-strait relations remain the most critical factor affecting next year’s presidential election, given the potential changing of the guard.
In December last year, Duke University conducted a survey on the nation’s development. The results revealed that 58.67 percent of participants believed that Taiwan independence is likely, while only 41.33 percent believed that cross-strait unification is more probable.
In January 2019, the same survey revealed that only 35.1 percent of respondents believed that “Taiwan’s independence is more likely,” while 64.9 percent believed that “cross-strait unification is more probable.”
The surveys were conducted after the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) won a victory against the Democratic Progressive Party in the local elections, and yet the results were the opposite.
Why has Taiwanese public opinion changed so drastically to support Taiwan independence?
Key changes in the structure of public opinion on cross-strait relations have occurred from 2019 to last year, influenced by internal and external factors.
First, in terms of internal factors, Taiwanese are strongly connected to the government that came to Taiwan in 1949 and its subsequent democratic practices.
The military and civilians collaborated to build the nation while defending against the armed threats of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Later, to confront the difficulties of survival experienced by nations that withdrew from the UN and terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the US, individuals from different walks of life ultimately completed a non-violent democratic transition. This was achieved through the rallying cry of community life, which enabled the voicing of diverse viewpoints and implementing them on a democratic stage.
Opposition to an extradition law in Hong Kong, which began in the middle of 2019, resulted in most Taiwanese recognizing that democracy and liberty are critical. As a result, significant skepticism was generated regarding a possible Taiwanese version of the CCP’s “one country, two systems” policy.
The CCP repeatedly emphasized the “one China” principle and remained clearly distinct from the Taiwanese government during this period.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson declared in April 2021 that the “Republic of China and its Constitution” had ceased to exist in 1949.
In February last year, the CCP’s official media publicly named KMT legislators and criticized them for promoting Taiwan’s diplomatic space.
This approach constitutes “secret independence that is more harmful to cross-strait relations,” it said.
The Taiwanese government has endured more than 70 years of struggle and ethnic integration, yet the CCP views it with contempt and disrespect.
How does the concept of “cross-strait unification” emotionally resonate with Taiwanese?
As Taiwan has its own Constitution, how many Taiwanese could be considered “Taiwan independence proponents” for rejecting unification, but think that “cross-strait unification is more likely?”
In terms of external factors, Taiwanese perceive US-China competition and its probable consequences. If Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) administration had not erroneously assessed the “rise of the East and decline of the West” and underestimated the Western democratic alliance, the CCP could have stayed competitive with the US.
However, the CCP in March 2018 responded robustly to former US president Donald Trump’s trade dispute, leading political elites to consolidate in the US under the anti-China banner and to increase their support for Taiwan.
Due to the US-China rivalry, the so-called “1992 consensus,” which had been facilitated by the “uncertain stage of the US-China strategy,” lost its obscurity in articulating “one China” and was exchanged for a crucial selection that Taiwan must decide.
The “1992 consensus” — a term that former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000 — refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the CCP that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge that there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
The choice is obvious. The friendship that has been established between Taiwan and the US is profound. The US has been an essential ally for a long time, providing aid and joint military defense during the Cold War and playing a crucial role in the development of Taiwan’s government.
Washington has been an indispensable partner. Taiwan and the US are “spiritually compatible” in their collaboration of democratic values and concepts, which Beijing, using verbal attacks and military threats, cannot substitute.
The evaluation made by Taiwanese concerning cross-strait relations demonstrates their confidence in the US eventually triumphing in its rivalry with China. Furthermore, they believe that Taiwan’s policy of upholding sovereign independence would receive greater backing.
Meng Chih-cheng is an associate professor in National Cheng Kung University’s Department of Political Science.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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