Since the dawn of international politics, smaller states have faced the formidable challenge of navigating great-power rivalries.
Today, it is the geopolitical contest between the US and China that has compelled countries to balance their competing national interests. Toward which side they gravitate depends on domestic and external circumstances.
Consider the Philippines, which has an interest in maintaining its growing economic ties with neighboring China as well as its half-century-old security alliance with the US. The Philippines’ previous president, Rodrigo Duterte, placed greater emphasis on the former, turning sharply away from the US and toward China after his election in 2016.
In exchange for effectively siding with China in the escalating great-power competition, Duterte sought Chinese investment in his pet project — the “Build! Build! Build!” infrastructure program — and moderation of China’s aggressive behavior in the West Philippine Sea, particularly its seizure of islets and outcroppings claimed by the Philippines.
However, China did not oblige. When Duterte’s presidency ended in June last year, China had delivered less than 5 percent of the US$24 billion it had pledged to invest in the Philippines, and its provocations in the West Philippine Sea, which comprises part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, continued unabated.
Duterte’s successor, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, has so far taken a more prudent strategic approach. Deeply concerned about the territorial disputes fueled by Chinese claims in the South China Sea, Marcos has decided to reaffirm and enhance his country’s partnership with the US.
To this end, the Philippines has decided to grant the US access to four more military bases — for a total of nine — some of which are located near disputed areas of the South China Sea. US troops rotate regularly through the designated bases.
The US and the Philippines have also agreed to resume joint patrols in the South China Sea, which, under Duterte, had been suspended for six years.
Beyond the US, the Philippines and Japan recently agreed to deepen defense ties, with Japanese troops securing greater access to Philippine territory for training and logistics.
Moreover, the Philippines is pursuing greater maritime cooperation with the UK. The two countries held their inaugural Maritime Dialogue on Feb. 7. Two weeks later, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Carlito Galvez Jr agreed with Australian Minister for Defence Richard Marles to formalize their “strategic” defense engagement — potentially including joint patrols in the South China Sea.
So, the Philippines is gradually becoming a key hub of military cooperation among Southeast Asian democracies. This affords the US important strategic benefits — for which China has only itself to blame.
Beijing’s efforts to bully its neighbors into acquiescing to its demands and preferences have not only failed, they have also led to the emergence of a kind of anti-China coalition in the Indo-Pacific region.
This has certainly been the case in South Korea. China imposed heavy economic sanctions on the country after it agreed in 2016 to deploy a US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system on its territory — a response to escalating threats from North Korea.
With that, public opinion in South Korea turned sharply against China. Measured on a scale of 1 to 100, South Korean sentiment toward China now stands at 26.4 — two points less favorable than sentiment toward North Korea (28.6), a Hankook Research poll showed in 2021.
Partly in response to public opinion, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, like Marcos, has sought to bolster its alliance with the US. He is also working to improve long-strained relations with Japan, not least by announcing a plan to compensate South Koreans who performed forced labor under Japanese colonial rule during World War II.
China’s aggressive sanctions against Australia — imposed in 2020 in response to Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 — spurred a similar foreign-policy reorientation. In September 2021, Australia formed an “enhanced security partnership,” known as AUKUS, with the UK and the US. As well, Australia, India, Japan, and the US have sought to enhance their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
All of these steps aim to bolster security, but they also carry risks. In his 1995 book Diplomacy, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger said that it was the imperial German leaders’ combination of “truculence” and “indecisiveness” that “hurled their country first into isolation and then into war.”
In Kissinger’s view, World War I erupted partly because leaders were “swayed by the emotions of the moment and hampered by an extraordinary lack of sensitivity to foreign psyches.” A similar dynamic could be at play today.
Ensuring that the dark history of the 20th century does not echo today requires sound judgement from both sides.
China must recognize the fear it has incited with its bullying, and democracies across the Indo-Pacific region must take care that their responses do not heighten tensions excessively.
Otherwise, we might well sleepwalk into catastrophe.
Yoon Young-kwan is a former South Korean minister of foreign affairs and professor emeritus of international relations at Seoul National University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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