Three fatal hiking incidents were among seven that required search-and-rescue operations during the 228 Memorial Day long weekend.
Nenggao Cross-Ridge Historic Trail (能高越嶺古道), where one of the fatal incidents occurred, is one of Taiwan’s top 15 hiking routes for which permits are required. During the long weekend, a hiker fell down a cliff and died, only six days after a similar fatal incident on the trail.
The government in October 2019 eased requirements and application procedures for 81 trails. When COVID-19 curbs were imposed a year later, many people flocked to the nation’s hiking trails.
Data from the National Fire Agency showed that the number of search-and-rescue missions after hiking incidents increased from 231 in 2019 to 608 in 2020, the highest in a decade. Even though trails were closed for two months during the pandemic, the agency counted 528 missions in 2021 and 566 last year.
From 2015 to 2021, the most common reasons for emergency calls were people “having gotten lost or reported missing” (43 percent), followed by “injuries” (20 percent), “illnesses and altitude sickness” (15 percent) and “falling off cliffs” (11 percent).
The vast majority of incidents were reported by self-organized hiking groups, accounting for 75.6 percent in 2020 and 68 percent in 2021, followed by solo hikers, accounting for 18 percent in 2020 and 12 percent in 2021.
National Airborne Service Corps data showed that it deployed helicopters for search-and-rescue operations 78 times in 2019. That number rose to 166 flights in 2020, 190 in 2021 and 170 last year.
The National Development Council in November last year announced a five-year project to increase the efficiency of mountain rescue operations. The project is to run from next year to 2028 and have a budget of NT$740 million (US$24.2 million), including for rescue equipment upgrades and boosting rescue training.
Several public hearings have been held in the past two years to better prevent hiking accidents. Mountain rescue professionals, hiking guides and experienced hikers expressed their concerns and made suggestions. Many of them said that unexperienced hikers might attempt difficult ascents, such as the most famous 100 peaks among Taiwan’s 268 mountains higher than 3,000m, after seeing pictures on social media, without being properly equipped or knowing the risks. Others might underestimate seemingly easier one-day hikes or be caught off guard by rapidly changing weather, while lacking essential equipment and enough water and food. They might overestimate their stamina and skills, and make unwise decisions.
Many prospective hikers seek out hiking partners or groups online. Such groups, consisting of members that do not know each other well, might not react appropriately and in a coordinated manner when facing emergency situations.
Tour guides leading commercial hiking groups vary greatly in terms of skill and qualifications, as there is no authority that oversees the sector. There is no regulation regarding the guide-to-hiker ratio, and while the Sports Administration issues certificates for hiking guides, no formal qualification is required to organize commercial hiking trips.
Hikers have the responsibility to be prepared when hitting the trails, but the government must also do its part. It should not only boost search-and-rescue capabilities, but create a unified difficulty rating system for trails, work with private-sector entities to provide safety information and regulate hiking companies. It should also determine which government agency is responsible. That could be the Sports Administration, the Forestry Bureau, the Tourism Bureau or the Ministry of the Interior.
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