Broadcasting Corp of China chairman and pan-blue pundit Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) unequivocally opposes President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) decision to extend the length of mandatory service to one year. Instead, Jaw suggests diverting resources into the domestic development of uncrewed aerial and naval systems.
The development of uncrewed military assets and extending the length of mandatory service to improve Taiwan’s reserve capabilities are not mutually exclusive goals. While the development of drones is important, Taiwan’s defense still needs a stronger reserve component to supplement its active-duty military, especially in light of Taiwan’s low birthrate.
Nevertheless, the sentiment that developing uncrewed systems would be the miracle cure to all of Taiwan’s defense woes is still very much prevalent among those who have a surface-level understanding of military hardware. Taiwan People’s Party Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) suggested that the procurement of F-16V jets is a waste of money. Alternatively, Ko suggested that a much more logical and affordable option would be to allocate funds to the development of uncrewed assets.
There are no uncrewed aerial systems that can replace modern jets. Armed drones, like General Atomics’ MQ-1 Predator, attack ground targets primarily in low-intensity airspace, where the enemy does not possess a robust air defense network. While the Predator had considerable success in the global fight against terrorism, NATO’s Joint Air Power Competence Centre concluded that “current systems are not yet ready to survive in non-permissive or hostile air environments.”
Even though Predator drones can perform a variety of mission sets — including surveillance, reconnaissance and close air support — they cannot engage enemy fighters.
While some countries have invested in the development of drones that specialize in air-to-air combat, most of these projects are premature. In 2021, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced the LongShot program, which is in preliminary design review. The LongShot would be a drone that is carried by crewed aircraft, but could also carry missiles. The drone would be released by fighters during combat to increase engagement range. These drones are designed to be platforms that support crewed fighters, not fully replace them. Multirole fighters such as the F-16V still have a role in combat for decades to come.
Furthermore, most drones used in combat during the Russo-Ukrainian war are small inexpensive ones with limited range. Procuring these drones would improve Taiwan’s asymmetrical capabilities on the tactical scale. Taiwan is already in the process of incorporating more drones, such as the Chien Hsiang anti-radiation drone. Nevertheless, the Russo-Ukrainian war shows that infantry units are still at the core of mounting an effective defense against an invading force. Drones provide a supporting role to the infantry, which still conducts the majority of the fighting. Even with the much-publicized Iranian Shahed-136 drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, these “wonder weapons” alone are unlikely to destroy Ukraine’s will to fight or shift the tide of the war.
Jaw and Ko think that it would be easy for Taiwan to develop next-generation drones on its own, without technical assistance from the US. Behind their rhetoric is the baseless belief that the sole goal of the Pentagon is to profit from Taiwan through arms sales. Therefore, they argue that Taiwan should aim to be completely self-reliant in its defense procurement.
The reality is that the Taiwanese arms industry is nowhere as advanced as the military-industrial complex in the US. It is willful ignorance to suggest otherwise.
Furthermore, the development of overly ambitious weapon systems incorporating unproven technologies usually ends up as a costly failure. For instance, the US’ littoral combat ships were pitched as inexpensive multi-role warships featuring revolutionary modular mission packages and advanced propulsion.
However, US Navy planners are already considering decommissioning nine relatively new Freedom-class littoral combat ships in fiscal 2023 due to frequent breakdowns and high maintenance costs.
Part of the reasoning behind acquiring asymmetrical capabilities is to have innumerable dispersible assets that cannot be effectively destroyed by the enemy during the opening hours of a conflict. Achieving these capabilities requires a nation to field a large, well-trained reserve.
As leaders in Taiwan implement measures to improve Taiwan’s asymmetrical capabilities, discrediting these efforts with baseless claims could be detrimental. Jaw’s opposition plays into the hand of Chinese cognitive warfare, which seeks to lower morale and confidence in the military among Taiwanese.
Taiwan’s multifaceted defense strategy requires conventional and asymmetrical assets. Drones, of all types, alone cannot fulfill these roles. To abandon the procurement of fighter jets in favor of drones would leave a huge gap in Taiwan’s air defense.
Similarly, to suggest that Taiwan can achieve all its asymmetrical capabilities with next-generation drones that do not even exist yet is simply unrealistic.
Linus Chiou studies physics and history at the University of Virginia.
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