In an interview with the Guardian published on Monday, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) said that Beijing might be using frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone to justify future military actions.
Wu correctly understands China’s modus operandi, which is to push boundaries to see what it can get away with before pushing further.
However, the government’s focus should not be on the air zone, which was created by the US military after World War II and is not recognized by China and even includes parts of China’s Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. Instead, the government should stay focused on incursions into the nation’s territorial waters and airspace, and attempts to test blockades.
Territorial waters and airspace are generally understood to extend 12 nautical miles (22km) from shore, so they cannot be enforced in the case of Kinmen and Lienchiang counties, which lie within 20km of China’s coast, but it would still be prudent for the government to set clear boundaries on incursions to prevent China from inching closer to Taiwan proper or even normalizing such behavior. Such boundaries would have to take into account normal activity for China in areas considered international territory, but they would demand a clear, unambiguous response in the event that Chinese activity affected Taiwan’s own lawful activity or national security.
For example, China on Aug. 4 launched 11 ballistic missiles toward areas near Taiwan proper, but none of the missiles landed within Taiwan’s territorial waters, and those fired over Taiwan reached atmospheric heights. Clearly the missiles were intended as a threat and are cause for concern, but they were deemed not to have had any direct impact on national security.
Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) on Oct. 5 said that the military would consider an incursion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) into the nation’s territorial airspace to be a “first strike.” He said that the military would launch “countermeasures” in response to such a contingency, but did not clarify what those countermeasures would be. Normally, the correct response to such an incursion would be to warn the aircraft entering the country’s airspace and then to fire upon it if such warnings went unheeded.
The military made good on a promise to shoot down Chinese drones entering Kinmen’s airspace, which it did on Sept. 1. Shooting down a fighter jet with a pilot inside would have much greater consequences than shooting down a drone. This is why Taiwan has to have a clear red line, and make sure the US and other countries are aware of its boundaries and the military’s planned responses. Otherwise, one of two outcomes could occur: The PLAAF could instruct one of its pilots to fly into Taiwan’s airspace knowing they would be shot down, and then argue that the pilot had simply veered off course and Taiwan had started a war; or Taiwan would fire warning shots and then China — knowing it had called Taiwan’s bluff — would be in an even better position to launch an invasion or blockade unimpeded.
Taiwan must have a clear action plan on incursions, and must not confuse the issue by talking about unenforceable identification zones.
Retired rear admiral Kung Chia-cheng (龔家政) this month said that Taiwan has missiles capable of reaching Beijing. Taiwan should continue to improve such offensive capabilities and make the consequences of attacking clear to Beijing. At the same time, Taipei should devise a clear bottom line on incursions and follow through on planned responses.
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