In an interview with the Guardian published on Monday, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) said that Beijing might be using frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone to justify future military actions.
Wu correctly understands China’s modus operandi, which is to push boundaries to see what it can get away with before pushing further.
However, the government’s focus should not be on the air zone, which was created by the US military after World War II and is not recognized by China and even includes parts of China’s Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. Instead, the government should stay focused on incursions into the nation’s territorial waters and airspace, and attempts to test blockades.
Territorial waters and airspace are generally understood to extend 12 nautical miles (22km) from shore, so they cannot be enforced in the case of Kinmen and Lienchiang counties, which lie within 20km of China’s coast, but it would still be prudent for the government to set clear boundaries on incursions to prevent China from inching closer to Taiwan proper or even normalizing such behavior. Such boundaries would have to take into account normal activity for China in areas considered international territory, but they would demand a clear, unambiguous response in the event that Chinese activity affected Taiwan’s own lawful activity or national security.
For example, China on Aug. 4 launched 11 ballistic missiles toward areas near Taiwan proper, but none of the missiles landed within Taiwan’s territorial waters, and those fired over Taiwan reached atmospheric heights. Clearly the missiles were intended as a threat and are cause for concern, but they were deemed not to have had any direct impact on national security.
Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) on Oct. 5 said that the military would consider an incursion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) into the nation’s territorial airspace to be a “first strike.” He said that the military would launch “countermeasures” in response to such a contingency, but did not clarify what those countermeasures would be. Normally, the correct response to such an incursion would be to warn the aircraft entering the country’s airspace and then to fire upon it if such warnings went unheeded.
The military made good on a promise to shoot down Chinese drones entering Kinmen’s airspace, which it did on Sept. 1. Shooting down a fighter jet with a pilot inside would have much greater consequences than shooting down a drone. This is why Taiwan has to have a clear red line, and make sure the US and other countries are aware of its boundaries and the military’s planned responses. Otherwise, one of two outcomes could occur: The PLAAF could instruct one of its pilots to fly into Taiwan’s airspace knowing they would be shot down, and then argue that the pilot had simply veered off course and Taiwan had started a war; or Taiwan would fire warning shots and then China — knowing it had called Taiwan’s bluff — would be in an even better position to launch an invasion or blockade unimpeded.
Taiwan must have a clear action plan on incursions, and must not confuse the issue by talking about unenforceable identification zones.
Retired rear admiral Kung Chia-cheng (龔家政) this month said that Taiwan has missiles capable of reaching Beijing. Taiwan should continue to improve such offensive capabilities and make the consequences of attacking clear to Beijing. At the same time, Taipei should devise a clear bottom line on incursions and follow through on planned responses.
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has
“Of course you can choose not to be Taiwanese, just do not stay here,” chairwoman of Taipei 101 operator Taipei Financial Center Corp Janet Chia (賈永婕) said in an online interview with local entertainer Tai Chih-yuan (邰智源), triggering intense discussion on social media, with politicians across party lines weighing in. In the interview, which was aired on May 14, Chia and Tai’s discussion over a meal in Taipei 101 covered Chia’s career change from entertainer to chairwoman and US climber Alex Honnold’s free solo climb up the Taipei 101 building. During the interview, Chia said, “Being on this land, we
RSS