Last month’s local election results were a repeat of the 2018 elections: the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) made big wins, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered ignominious defeats. On both occasions, Beijing exploited the outcomes for its own purpose, saying that the results represented a victory for Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). That is pure propaganda.
On closer analysis, given the similarity in the results, we can see a new trend emerging: Taiwanese vote differently in presidential elections than in local ones.
It is possible these differences could be creating a two-party model of power balance that is unique to Taiwan, in which the DPP controls the central government and the KMT dominates local governments. This is quite different from a conventional two-party system.
There are several possible causes for this.
First is the social organization in authoritarian Taiwan from the 1950s to the 1990s, in which the KMT had for 40 years operated and controlled local factions.
The second reason is that the democratization process happened without a violent revolution or bloodshed, which meant that the existing monopoly structures underwent a gradual relaxation without being comprehensively democratized.
Third, in the current perilous politico-economic situation, Taiwan’s national status and its stance on cross-strait relations is contested in national elections for president and legislators, whereas voters tend to favor the opposition in the local elections, to make sure no one party becomes dominant.
If the voters in last month’s elections had intended to create a balance of power between the two parties, they certainly succeeded, and are to be congratulated.
In the four years since the KMT’s 2018 local elections victories, Beijing has worked hard to make connections with and engage in exchanges with KMT local government heads.
However, almost all of those who were re-elected have been wary of, if not avoiding entirely, these advances, in the full knowledge that being connected with China is politically toxic.
As a result, local voters have not been overly concerned with casting their ballots for the KMT, but they have been keeping an eye on them, and would only give them a second chance if they keep China at arm’s length and look out for Taiwan’s interests.
All in all, on this occasion the KMT did not lose its voter base.
Meanwhile, some DPP figures had sought to use the political message of “opposing China and protecting Taiwan” to provoke their KMT rivals and make gains in local government.
During the Martial Law period, former presidents Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), had clung to their KMT party-state dictatorship on the pretext of the need to “retake the mainland.”
More than three decades later, the DPP has sought to use a similar tactic, trying to maintain dominance with its “oppose China and protect Taiwan” message to secure control over the central and local governments.
This time, the lesson is still fresh and the electorate was not buying it.
Moreover, with war becoming increasingly possible, the governing party has a responsibility to make Taiwanese aware of the importance of military preparedness and whether the nation has the means to defend itself. It needs to do so without using it as a slogan to manipulate elections, even if it means losing votes. As a result, the DPP was not even able to excite its own voter base.
Taiwanese have lived under threat their whole lives, and in the nine-in-one elections they were bombarded with intimidation, verbally or through military means, from the Chinese Communist Party overseas.
At home, they faced pro-independence extremist elements in the DPP on the one hand, and pro-unification extremist elements within the KMT on the other.
Despite this, voters used their ballots to send a clear message: Taiwanese will not accept any kind of threat or intimidation, and will elect officials they believe would best serve them.
From the results, it seems that the electorate was more focused on the candidates’ looks, academic pedigree, how well-connected they were or whether they come from a “powerful” family. That is, they went for good looks and good luck over political experience, campaign promises or governing ability, all of which were consigned to second place.
Another consideration is that voter turnout last month was quite low, and the parties mostly ran negative campaigns, something the KMT tends to be better at than the DPP. For example, both parties levied allegations of fake degrees and plagiarized theses at each other.
Some voters cast their ballots for KMT candidates to teach the DPP a lesson for constantly playing the ideology card, taking up state resources and not dealing with issues that are important to voters’ lives. Voting for the opposition party was the most effective way to hit back.
It is impossible to govern free of burdens when the opposition started turning voters’ frustrations with government policy into hate for the government, while calling for a change of party.
This convinced some voters to choose mediocre candidates rather than vote for the governing party.
Strategic voting also came to play: Hatred for the enemy often trumps loyalty to one’s own party.
Another issue was that, as the competition heated up and the stakes got higher, with potential lawsuits in the offing, candidates gained greater sympathy and support. The Taiwanese electorate cast ballots regardless of candidates’ misconduct or criminal history.
Almost all of the local KMT leaders involved in corruption and the criminal underworld were elected, showing that control over local politics is wielded by criminals.
Some people kept whispering rumors that were unfavorable to the ruling party and its policies, such as that the epidemic prevention measures were “making money and murdering people.” There was no evidence for such appalling allegations, but some voters were considerably vulnerable to such deception.
While the electorate can be commended for once again demonstrating that it would not be coerced to vote against its will through threats and intimidation, voters are not yet as sophisticated or discerning as they perhaps could ideally be.
A democracy that is not run according to the rule of law is a hobbled democracy, for freedom without the rule of law is freedom that can be abused.
At a time when elections in Taiwan are garnering increased international attention, if local heads of government are elected through negative campaigning or because of their individual photogenic qualities, Taiwan would become a laughing stock.
It is also a matter of concern that Taiwan’s two-party balance is taking the form of the DPP dominating the central government and the KMT holding most of the cards at the local level.
Taiwan will be a safer state only when it deepens its democracy and the rule of law.
Shih Fang-long is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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