The South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are the two key areas of confrontation between China and the US.
According to data recently published by The War Zone, a military column on The Drive news Web site, Beijing has expanded construction in the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島). On features such as Cuarteron Reef (Huayang Reef, 華陽礁), Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Reef, 永暑礁), Mischief Reef (Meiji Reef, 美濟礁), Gaven Reef (Nansyun Reef, 南薰礁) and the Thitu Reefs’ (Jhongye Reefs, 中業群礁) Subi Reef (渚碧礁), Beijing has built runways, living quarters, ports and even recreational facilities.
The facilities appear to be strong, but they might not withstand a strike in a modern war.
Former commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command Harry Harris once called the Chinese government’s policy of turning reefs into forts as a “great wall of sand” in the eyes of the US military.
Apart from the massive costs to maintain the facilities, they are not easy to hide. They would be exposed to US satellites, anti-submarine aircraft and uncrewed surveillance aircraft during wartime.
Due to their location and the detailed intelligence available, such reefs would be unlikely to play a key role in wartime, perhaps even becoming the first targets for destruction.
Most of the features that China has developed in the South China Sea are small and therefore “easy to attack, but difficult to defend.”
Among the mass of US forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific region, carrier-based aircraft and large bombers stationed in Guam are capable of destroying installations on the reefs from thousands of kilometers away with long-range guided missiles, including AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles and AGM-154 joint standoff weapons.
Even though Mischief Reef has simple hangars and runways, they would be unlikely to survive a war.
Those who disagree with this assessment might ask why the US military has also been building facilities and deploying troops on islands in Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, Hawaii, Guam, the Diego Garcia of the British Indian Ocean Territory and other islands for years.
However, the US military’s installations are on much larger islands. The total area of the Okinawa islands that have US infrastructure is 1,414km, while Fiery Cross Reef is only 2.8km.
The size of an island would definitely affect military tactics and deployment.
Beijing’s island-building in the South China Sea only appears to be rock solid. It is merely for reconnaissance and to bolster sovereignty claims during peacetime. The chances that such places would survive a war are low.
Ray Song is a doctoral student in Tamkang University’s Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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