Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) path to an unprecedented third term shows that the old Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is dead. The collective leadership emphasized by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and the power shared by the three branches — party, government and military — has proven to be too weak to function as a checks-and-balances mechanism to maintain institutional integrity. The new CCP is ruled by one man with the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP serving as his rubber stamp.
With a few minutes of public shaming of his predecessor, Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), who helped him attain the highest political position, Xi showed the world that the old guard of the CCP have been deprived of any political influence, and he is the only boss.
His shrewd cruelty was in full display. That political trait might have developed during his youth when he was punished due to his father’s “sin” as a political dissident working in the countryside. Xi appears to understand the pitfalls of losing power in China, and learned how Mao Zedong (毛澤東) secured his supreme-leader position through Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution.
Incidentally, Xi’s “white guards” during the COVID-19 pandemic have proven to be equally, if not more, effective in silencing opposition.
The serious question remains of not whether, but when, Xi would invade Taiwan, given the vast power he wields. There are a few good reasons he might not invade until the end of his five-year term.
First, he has only just consolidated his power, and needs time to quash remaining dissidents in key government and military positions.
Second, Russia is being defeated in Ukraine. If Xi invades Taiwan this year, or early next year, it could be interpreted as a premeditated contract with Russian President Vladimir Putin. That could cost China in international public opinion by linking it to a fair share of the crimes committed in the invasion of Ukraine.
Third, the scenario of a peaceful takeover of Taiwan through supporting an agent to be elected as Taiwan’s president in 2024 cannot be ruled out, as it is the best method conquering a nation without firing a shot.
Fourth, inasmuch as Xi wants to take over Taiwan, he would enjoy his “emperor” status more without the burden of a war. Avoiding the risk of defeat in a major war until it is absolutely necessary would ensure his “emperor for life” strategy by balancing risk with benefit.
Fifth, the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Zi (孫子) said that “the winners win the war before seeking to fight; the losers fight the war before seeking to win.”
China’s military readiness and strength, according to experts, is no match to that of the US, although China has a clear edge in hypersonic missiles.
However, without a successful operation by ground troops, an air raid would remain a nuisance. Xi would be smart enough not to launch a war prematurely.
By surrounding himself with sycophants, Xi’s weaknesses are many. His aggression would not withstand the strength of united democratic and free countries.
In light of the three most important steps for success — preparation, preparation and preparation — United Microelectronics Corp founder and former chairman Robert Tsao’s (曹興誠) foresight to train “3 million warriors and 300,000 marksmen” should be greatly appreciated.
Other routes to defeat Xi before he launches a war could still have a chance.
Not dissimilar to Mao, who starved millions of people to death during the 1958 “Great Leap Forward,” Xi’s concept of socialism and “zero COVID-19” policy has weakened China’s capabilities. Further economic sanctions would cripple China’s military might.
The free world must punish Russia for its war crimes by dividing it into several democratic and free countries after its invasion of Ukraine. It should also consider liberating North Korea to isolate China as the world’s last empire.
Democratizing China might seem impossible, but giving up hope is not an option. Dismantling China’s Internet “iron curtain” to deliver the truth to its people through satellite communication technology could be much cheaper than war. A youth movement offers the best chance for regime change, as a spark can cause a prairie fire.
For its part, Taiwan needs to legislate to prohibit any insiders from aiding the enemy if a war breaks out, and provide the means to enable Taiwanese to help defeat the enemy. As the saying goes: “Born in trouble; die in comfort.”
In The Art of War (孫子兵法), Zi wrote: “Do not count on their inaction; count on our being prepared. Do not count on their failure to attack; count on our being unattackable.”
Taiwan needs to be vigilant and well-prepared.
James J. Y. Hsu is a retired physics professor.
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