In recent decades, observers of American foreign policy have come to see it as a thoroughly executive branch responsibility. Understandably so. Congress has long demonstrated only episodic interest in foreign affairs, and not always in the most constructive ways.
Fortunately, this looks to be changing.
Recent case-in-point, Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Yes, it was mostly symbolic. I mean, one thing the Constitution does give the executive is indisputable control over America’s official diplomatic contacts.
As symbolic gestures go, however, the Speaker’s visit was a very powerful one.
One, because it demonstrated support for Taiwan during the tensest time in cross-straits relations since at least the 1990s. That’s important. The next likely speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), says he’ll go to Taiwan to make the same point. He should.
Two, because it shows American resolve. All accounts indicate that President Biden was not happy with the Speaker’s visit. News of it conflicted with an imminent phone call with Xi Jinping (習近平).
Engagements like this have long inhibited America’s China policy. My friend and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Randy Schriver calls it the “tyranny of the calendar”. The US invests so much in diplomatic exchanges with China that it pulls punches at the most critical moments.
Congress is having none of this. Pelosi’s defiance of the administration’s entreaties to cancel and follow-on visits by Senator Ed Markey (D-MA), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Subcommittee on East Asia, and Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) demonstrated this loud and clear.
Congressional visits to Taiwan are common occurrences. Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) was there during the July 4th recess. April recess saw a visit by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Senators Rob Portman (R-OH), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Richard Burr (R-NC), and Ben Sasse (R-NE). Last year, visiting Senators included John Cornyn (R-TX), Mike Lee (R-UT), Dan Sullivan (R-AK), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), and Mike Crapo (R-ID).
In addition to their symbolic importance, these trips are critical to Congress carrying out its foreign policy responsibilities. Control over official diplomatic relationships does not mean the President has exclusive control of foreign policy. That function is designed to be shared.
Now, as Congress heads into an intense legislative period after Labor Day, we’re going to see just how much farther than symbolism and simple oversight it is willing to go in asserting its powers.
On September 14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will mark-up the Taiwan Policy Act, a long-overdue “comprehensive overhaul” of Taiwan Policy — as its authors describe it. The bill does several necessary things. Among them, it changes the title of America’s de-facto ambassador to Taiwan from “Director” to “Representative” and requires his confirmation by the Senate; clarifies the types of weapons the US will make available to Taiwan; and designates Taiwan a “major non-NATO ally” for purposes of arms transfers.
Perhaps most importantly, the bill brings to a head a debate currently raging in the American policy community over which arms to prioritize for Taiwan, and whether, in the interest of speedy delivery, the US should provide some of them free of charge.
Congress is a funny place. What the Senate should do is mark-up the Taiwan Policy Act, open it to amendment on the Senate floor, and continue through the regular order until the bill is sent to the President.
The problem is that you need floor time for this, which is never in abundance on foreign policy issues, especially as the session winds down. It also depends on the interest of the Senate Majority Leader, who will be lobbied hard by the administration to shelve the bill. As a result, if the bill sees any action at all, Congress will likely carve out its weapons-related provisions (Title II) and attach them to the annual, must-pass National Defense Authorization Act.
In the process, it will jettison the bill’s other critical provisions. Among these is an entire title imposing sanctions for future Chinese hostilities against Taiwan. Senator Sullivan’s “STAND with Taiwan” Act, now in the Banking Committee, does similar, although fittingly, in a far more punishing fashion.
Beijing needs to know the full scope of the US reaction to aggression, not just the likely military response. It would be a mistake to leave behind provisions explicitly designed to enhance this deterrence with the promise to get to it next Congress.
As demonstrated by consideration of the last so-called “China bill”, eventually called “Chips-plus,” this can take a really long time with no assurances that Congress will act at all, or act in the most relevant ways.
Congress, and especially the Senate, is supposed to be the venue for the big debates about America’s future, including its foreign policy. It is only appropriate that it serve this function on Taiwan policy. More than 40 years after passage of the TRA, it’s up to Congress to prove itself capable of the sort of real, major reform that can keep China at bay. In so doing, it will help prove an even more consequential point – that it is worthy of the foreign policy powers the founders gave it.
Walter Lohman is former director of The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
Congratulations to China’s working class — they have officially entered the “Livestock Feed 2.0” era. While others are still researching how to achieve healthy and balanced diets, China has already evolved to the point where it does not matter whether you are actually eating food, as long as you can swallow it. There is no need for cooking, chewing or making decisions — just tear open a package, add some hot water and in a short three minutes you have something that can keep you alive for at least another six hours. This is not science fiction — it is reality.
A foreign colleague of mine asked me recently, “What is a safe distance from potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force’s (PLARF) Taiwan targets?” This article will answer this question and help people living in Taiwan have a deeper understanding of the threat. Why is it important to understand PLA/PLARF targeting strategy? According to RAND analysis, the PLA’s “systems destruction warfare” focuses on crippling an adversary’s operational system by targeting its networks, especially leadership, command and control (C2) nodes, sensors, and information hubs. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, noted in his 15 May 2025 Sedona Forum keynote speech that, as
In a world increasingly defined by unpredictability, two actors stand out as islands of stability: Europe and Taiwan. One, a sprawling union of democracies, but under immense pressure, grappling with a geopolitical reality it was not originally designed for. The other, a vibrant, resilient democracy thriving as a technological global leader, but living under a growing existential threat. In response to rising uncertainties, they are both seeking resilience and learning to better position themselves. It is now time they recognize each other not just as partners of convenience, but as strategic and indispensable lifelines. The US, long seen as the anchor
Kinmen County’s political geography is provocative in and of itself. A pair of islets running up abreast the Chinese mainland, just 20 minutes by ferry from the Chinese city of Xiamen, Kinmen remains under the Taiwanese government’s control, after China’s failed invasion attempt in 1949. The provocative nature of Kinmen’s existence, along with the Matsu Islands off the coast of China’s Fuzhou City, has led to no shortage of outrageous takes and analyses in foreign media either fearmongering of a Chinese invasion or using these accidents of history to somehow understand Taiwan. Every few months a foreign reporter goes to
RSS