In recent decades, observers of American foreign policy have come to see it as a thoroughly executive branch responsibility. Understandably so. Congress has long demonstrated only episodic interest in foreign affairs, and not always in the most constructive ways.
Fortunately, this looks to be changing.
Recent case-in-point, Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Yes, it was mostly symbolic. I mean, one thing the Constitution does give the executive is indisputable control over America’s official diplomatic contacts.
As symbolic gestures go, however, the Speaker’s visit was a very powerful one.
One, because it demonstrated support for Taiwan during the tensest time in cross-straits relations since at least the 1990s. That’s important. The next likely speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), says he’ll go to Taiwan to make the same point. He should.
Two, because it shows American resolve. All accounts indicate that President Biden was not happy with the Speaker’s visit. News of it conflicted with an imminent phone call with Xi Jinping (習近平).
Engagements like this have long inhibited America’s China policy. My friend and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Randy Schriver calls it the “tyranny of the calendar”. The US invests so much in diplomatic exchanges with China that it pulls punches at the most critical moments.
Congress is having none of this. Pelosi’s defiance of the administration’s entreaties to cancel and follow-on visits by Senator Ed Markey (D-MA), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Subcommittee on East Asia, and Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) demonstrated this loud and clear.
Congressional visits to Taiwan are common occurrences. Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) was there during the July 4th recess. April recess saw a visit by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Senators Rob Portman (R-OH), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Richard Burr (R-NC), and Ben Sasse (R-NE). Last year, visiting Senators included John Cornyn (R-TX), Mike Lee (R-UT), Dan Sullivan (R-AK), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), and Mike Crapo (R-ID).
In addition to their symbolic importance, these trips are critical to Congress carrying out its foreign policy responsibilities. Control over official diplomatic relationships does not mean the President has exclusive control of foreign policy. That function is designed to be shared.
Now, as Congress heads into an intense legislative period after Labor Day, we’re going to see just how much farther than symbolism and simple oversight it is willing to go in asserting its powers.
On September 14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will mark-up the Taiwan Policy Act, a long-overdue “comprehensive overhaul” of Taiwan Policy — as its authors describe it. The bill does several necessary things. Among them, it changes the title of America’s de-facto ambassador to Taiwan from “Director” to “Representative” and requires his confirmation by the Senate; clarifies the types of weapons the US will make available to Taiwan; and designates Taiwan a “major non-NATO ally” for purposes of arms transfers.
Perhaps most importantly, the bill brings to a head a debate currently raging in the American policy community over which arms to prioritize for Taiwan, and whether, in the interest of speedy delivery, the US should provide some of them free of charge.
Congress is a funny place. What the Senate should do is mark-up the Taiwan Policy Act, open it to amendment on the Senate floor, and continue through the regular order until the bill is sent to the President.
The problem is that you need floor time for this, which is never in abundance on foreign policy issues, especially as the session winds down. It also depends on the interest of the Senate Majority Leader, who will be lobbied hard by the administration to shelve the bill. As a result, if the bill sees any action at all, Congress will likely carve out its weapons-related provisions (Title II) and attach them to the annual, must-pass National Defense Authorization Act.
In the process, it will jettison the bill’s other critical provisions. Among these is an entire title imposing sanctions for future Chinese hostilities against Taiwan. Senator Sullivan’s “STAND with Taiwan” Act, now in the Banking Committee, does similar, although fittingly, in a far more punishing fashion.
Beijing needs to know the full scope of the US reaction to aggression, not just the likely military response. It would be a mistake to leave behind provisions explicitly designed to enhance this deterrence with the promise to get to it next Congress.
As demonstrated by consideration of the last so-called “China bill”, eventually called “Chips-plus,” this can take a really long time with no assurances that Congress will act at all, or act in the most relevant ways.
Congress, and especially the Senate, is supposed to be the venue for the big debates about America’s future, including its foreign policy. It is only appropriate that it serve this function on Taiwan policy. More than 40 years after passage of the TRA, it’s up to Congress to prove itself capable of the sort of real, major reform that can keep China at bay. In so doing, it will help prove an even more consequential point – that it is worthy of the foreign policy powers the founders gave it.
Walter Lohman is former director of The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
On Sept. 3 in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rolled out a parade of new weapons in PLA service that threaten Taiwan — some of that Taiwan is addressing with added and new military investments and some of which it cannot, having to rely on the initiative of allies like the United States. The CCP’s goal of replacing US leadership on the global stage was advanced by the military parade, but also by China hosting in Tianjin an August 31-Sept. 1 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which since 2001 has specialized
In an article published by the Harvard Kennedy School, renowned historian of modern China Rana Mitter used a structured question-and-answer format to deepen the understanding of the relationship between Taiwan and China. Mitter highlights the differences between the repressive and authoritarian People’s Republic of China and the vibrant democracy that exists in Taiwan, saying that Taiwan and China “have had an interconnected relationship that has been both close and contentious at times.” However, his description of the history — before and after 1945 — contains significant flaws. First, he writes that “Taiwan was always broadly regarded by the imperial dynasties of
A large part of the discourse about Taiwan as a sovereign, independent nation has centered on conventions of international law and international agreements between outside powers — such as between the US, UK, Russia, the Republic of China (ROC) and Japan at the end of World War II, and between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since recognition of the PRC as the sole representative of China at the UN. Internationally, the narrative on the PRC and Taiwan has changed considerably since the days of the first term of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic
A report by the US-based Jamestown Foundation on Tuesday last week warned that China is operating illegal oil drilling inside Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island (Dongsha, 東沙群島), marking a sharp escalation in Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics. The report said that, starting in July, state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp installed 12 permanent or semi-permanent oil rig structures and dozens of associated ships deep inside Taiwan’s EEZ about 48km from the restricted waters of Pratas Island in the northeast of the South China Sea, islands that are home to a Taiwanese garrison. The rigs not only typify