China’s launching of missiles over Taiwan during military drills earlier this month was “irresponsible,” and something that must be contested, a senior US Navy official said on Tuesday.
“It’s very important that we contest this type of thing. If we just allow [missiles over Taiwan] to happen, and we don’t contest that, that’ll be the next norm,” US Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Karl Thomas said.
In Taiwan, news of the missiles went public only after a report by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, as five of the missiles landed in Japanese waters. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) decision not to issue air-raid warnings drew some criticism, but its rationale for not doing so is sound. China hoped the launches would incite terror among Taiwanese and the MND dashed that hope by not reporting them until after the fact. There is also the issue of the missiles’ peak altitude, estimated at between 150 and 250km. At that height the missiles would have entered the thermosphere — far above the 10km to 13km altitude at which commercial planes fly.
However, such tests are not without danger, and that is why they cannot become normalized. On descent, the missiles could collide with aircraft or vessels, including smaller fishing boats that might not be aware that tests are taking place. Even if vessels and aircraft are notified of tests and leave the area, the disruptions to their operations would have an economic impact.
The US and other countries might pressure China over the testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but Beijing is not alone in conducting such tests. The US on Tuesday tested its Minuteman III ICBM, and while Washington has a Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement with Russia, there is no such agreement with China.
Taiwan is unlikely to be able to work out any sort of agreement on missile testing with China, but the US could seek to reach a launch notification agreement with Beijing, and an agreement on where ICBMs could be tested. However, Beijing might simply break such an agreement, just as it has done with agreements on Hong Kong’s autonomy.
That leaves the question of what can be done to prevent further ICBM launches over Taiwan.
The American Physical Society in January reported that the US military’s current defenses against ICBMs are inadequate. Rand Corp defense researcher Bruce Bennett was quoted by Voice of America as saying that using the US’ ground-based interceptors to stop an incoming ICBM would be like “shooting a bullet with a bullet.”
If ICBM launches over Taiwan do become regular, US researchers could work with Taiwanese researchers to study the launches and jointly develop a more effective defense system. Another option would be for Taiwanese researchers to work with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries to develop a modified version of Israel’s Iron Dome for use in Taiwan.
Such a system could also benefit South Korea and Japan, which face missile threats from North Korea. An effective next-generation missile-defense system is something that would benefit all of these nations, and something that the best minds from these nations should jointly develop.
It is clear that China aims to continue testing its boundaries and encroaching on Taiwan’s sovereignty. It is imperative that Taiwan work with the US and other friendly nations to take concrete actions now to prevent that from happening.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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