The events in Ukraine have stimulated public debate in Taiwan about the threat of a Chinese invasion.
It is absurd that it would take events unfolding half a world away, and only now, to get this debate going. Of course, the debate has never gone away, although the political class often appears to have taken its eye off the ball.
A major reason that other nations have been willing to come to Ukraine’s aid is the resolve its armed forces — and particularly its military reservists and citizens who have taken up arms — have shown in fighting the aggressor. Taiwanese would also need to show a willingness to fight if the US and other allies are expected to come to Taiwan’s aid.
This is true, but it must go beyond the optics, and while changes to the reservist system and debate about extending conscription from four months to one year are important, they beg the question of why this is only happening now.
In 2019, retired US Marine Corps colonel Grant Newsham came to Taiwan to evaluate the nation’s defense capabilities and concluded that there was a solid core of well-trained troops and excellent officers, but that the military reserve system was in chaos.
In January, the Ministry of National Defense established the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency to reform the reservist system: The first batch of 400 aspiring reservists reported for duty on March 5 for two weeks of intensive weapons firing and maintenance, disaster prevention and the legal aspects of military training.
While it appears that the government is moving in the right direction, it was a trial run, involving about 15,000 reservists, with the program to be continued in the second and third quarters and then reviewed in the fourth. That is, a whole year is to pass before the new program — which arguably is only marginally better than the current one — is to be evaluated.
The government and the agency must be more ambitious with the overhaul of the reserve system, and do it with a greater sense of urgency. This should involve not only increasing the frequency, duration and quality of training sessions, but also have reservists joining drills with the standing army, to ensure maximum operational cohesion.
Taiwan’s standing army is supplemented by mandatory conscription, but the length of compulsory service has since 2000, mostly under former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), been gradually reduced to four months. It is only now, in President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) sixth year in office, that reverting the duration to one year is being considered.
Again, the question is how much longer the government is to drag its feet? Surely, neither the government nor the ministry need more time to work out what needs to be done.
The quality of the training — whether the duration is four months or one year — is another aspect that has gone unaddressed for far too long: Many young men say their reluctance to do military service is due to the perception that it is a waste of time — stories of pushing pens and pulling up weeds instead of proper training — not because of their unwillingness to fight for their country.
Having a civilian force, providing training for volunteers willing to defend Taiwan in the same vein as what is happening in Ukraine is another option the government could consider. This does not mean waiting for the unthinkable to happen, and then placing guns in people’s hands and wishing them the best of luck: A systematic and comprehensive training program must be developed.
If the government is to learn from Ukraine’s example, it will need to get ahead of the curve, and do so fast.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS