The Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) on Feb. 17 released salary data for counties and cities for the first time, which found that Hsinchu City in 2020 had the highest average annual salary at NT$972,000. Taipei was second with NT$863,000 and Hsinchu County third with NT$858,000. Changhua County had the lowest average annual salary at NT$518,000, while Pingtung County was the second-lowest with NT$535,000 and Penghu County the third-lowest with NT$544,000.
The DGBAS said that high salaries in Hsinchu City and Hsinchu County were driven mainly by technology companies that have a large number of highly paid professionals working in and around the Hsinchu Science Park (新竹科學園區). Taipei benefited from financial and insurance companies, and being home to several corporate headquarters. As for Changhua, Pingtung and Penghu, they are the nation’s least industrialized counties and attract fewer business opportunities, the DGBAS said.
The 2020 salary data also revealed some interesting facts. Salaries in Taoyuan were higher than in New Taipei City. Despite the considerably lower cost of living, Taoyuan’s average annual salary of NT$677,000, the nation’s fourth-highest, was higher than the more costly New Taipei City’s NT$637,000, the sixth-highest.
Taichung’s average was NT$591,000, placing it last among the nation’s six special municipalities. Kaohsiung was eighth overall with NT$619,000, while Tainan was ninth with NT$613,000.
Salaries in Miaoli County, the fifth-highest at NT$640,000, and Keelung, the seventh-highest at NT$621,000, were higher than in Kaohsiung and Tainan, even though they are less densely populated than the two big cities.
Ten counties and cities posted salaries of less than NT$600,000 per year on average. Among them were Chiayi City, and Chiayi, Hualien, Nantou, Yilan and Taitung counties.
The DGBAS said the salary statistics reflect the economic and industrial structure of each county and city. As high-paying industries develop — such as in the high-tech, financial, insurance and medical sectors — average salaries increase. It is undeniable that employees in such industries receive relatively good starting salaries, but they also face more pressure regarding rising living costs, and a higher risk of layoffs or salary cuts, as was seen during the COVID-19 pandemic.
What needs further observation is whether Taiwan is moving into an M-shaped society at an accelerating pace, whether consumer purchasing power is becoming polarized as the economy grows and if the income gap between more and less-developed regions is continuing to widen.
What also deserves attention is that higher salaries in the Hsinchu area indicate a growing number of high-income earners in the information and communications technology sector, especially the semiconductor industry. The magnetic pull of these firms extracts talent from other regions and economic sectors.
For instance, as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co expands its operations in Taiwan and overseas, it has in three years attracted more than 10,000 employees with backgrounds in science and technology. Last week, the Taiwan Association of Machinery Industry called on the government to respond to its sector’s loss of talent to the semiconductor and electronics industries, leaving manufacturing firms facing a significant shortage of workers at a time when they require more labor to meet market demand.
Taiwan faces not only a shortage of talent in a variety of sectors, but also imbalanced development in the nation’s industrial structure — an issue that demands swift government action.
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