Many European nations have been flexing their pro-Taiwan credentials over the past few years. In return, among other gestures of gratitude, the sky over Kaohsiung was adorned with the flags of the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. This year’s Lantern Festival light show is the city’s way of thanking those countries for their donations of COVID-19 vaccines.
Most of these countries had much more to be thanked for. Prague made headlines when it signed a sister-city agreement with Taipei, while Czech politicians have been at the forefront of parliamentary visits to the country. In 2020, Czech Senate President Milos Vystrcil proclaimed to the Legislative Yuan and the international media: “I am Taiwanese.”
In a similar vein, Lithuania defied precedent when it opted to call Taiwan’s new de facto embassy in Vilnius the Taiwanese Representative Office.
Now, after government and business visits, Taiwan and Slovakia are also looking to set up new trade offices in each other’s countries.
Whether “Taiwanese” is used again or the more Beijing-friendly “Taipei,” this is a positive move for Taiwan.
Aside from the economic wins, such interactions have significant symbolic value, as each one of these actions help ease the country’s diplomatic isolation.
It is a shame that there are not more European countries that can be congratulated for taking head-on Beijing’s campaign to marginalize Asia’s finest democracy.
Why should the rest of Europe, full of far more powerful liberal democracies, leave this responsibility to a few east European countries? Why was the Union Jack not sparkling across the Kaohsiung skyline?
That final question raises issues that are long and complicated, requiring an explanation as much about London’s relationship with Beijing as its ties with Taipei.
Instead, I want to explore whether this might be changing and whether the so-called “mother of parliaments” might live up to its name.
The arrival of the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee this month would have been a good opportunity to rally support for Taiwan in the UK.
However, those of us calling for a deeper partnership between both states were on Thursday treated to a back-bench business debate, which showed cross-party support for friendship and cooperation with Taiwan. While it was just a debate, when compared with a Westminster Hall debate nearly five years ago, we can see that there has been a noticeable shift in the way British MPs view and speak about Taiwan.
Unfortunately, the previous debate was too narrowly focused on Taiwan as a trade opportunity. While enhancing economic ties between both sides is, of course, welcome, the proceedings felt like a one-way conversation, with Conservative MPs keen to promote industries in their own constituencies from agricultural produce to sources of renewable energy.
Moreover, it missed so much of what Taiwan is about and the problems it faces from across the Strait. References to Taiwan’s liberal democratic values were sandwiched between trade statistics, while many speakers overlooked the trouble Taipei faced participating in international forums.
The latest debate put a lot more emphasis on Taiwan as a fellow liberal democracy. More or less every speaker underlined the point about the values shared by both sides. As such, as well as general calls for solidarity, there was more talk about Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations, and repeated recognition of Taiwan’s deft handling of COVID-19 and how its public health successes only reinforce the argument for its participation in the WHO.
It was refreshing to see parliamentarians speak about the expertise that Taiwanese can offer the rest of the world and not just their wallets (although members on both sides of the House were keen to commend Taiwan for being the world’s fourth-largest market for Scotch whisky — long may it continue).
The discussion also framed Taiwan’s predicament in a wider global contest in which liberal democracies are increasingly competing with revisionist authoritarian powers.
Of course, this approach carries risks. There is a temptation to draw parallels with the likes of Ukraine and Hong Kong, the usefulness of which are limited.
Moreover, in an ideal world, more parliamentarians would champion Taiwan because it is Taiwan, rather than another front line with the autocratic world.
However, if the situation in Ukraine wakes politicians up to the concerning trends in the Taiwan Strait, so be it.
While there were numerous references to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats toward Kiev, the situation with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Taipei was not discussed as if the threat was as similarly imminent.
The lack of alarmism and military talk during the debate was welcome, as too was the restraint shown by most members who did not use the opportunity to derail a discussion about Taiwan into a recital of all the crimes of the Chinese Communist Party.
Nor did they appear to display pro-Taiwan credentials to signal how strongly they were standing up to China.
Indeed, as Alicia Kearns, a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee who opened the debate, said: “When I call for Taiwan to have greater international recognition, it is on account of its democracy, its expertise and its status as a free-market friend; not as a tool in a wider struggle.”
Going forward it would be good for MPs to push for more practical steps and policies for the British government to take to support and deepen relations with Taiwan. Calls for standing in solidarity with Taiwan are well and good, but they are not as good as calling for tangible things.
The British government will express support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations for which statehood is not a prerequisite. Therefore, instead of asking ministers to reaffirm this point, MPs should be pushing them to outline the concrete steps they will take to achieve this or, failing that, what steps the British government will take to mitigate Taiwan’s exclusion, either by enhancing bilateral exchanges or working through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.
There were some specific requests to the government, including: Cabinet-level visits to Taipei, the signing of a bilateral free-trade agreement and a pledge to champion Taiwan’s inclusion in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership should Britain join.
There were also some announcements.
The British minister for Asia mentioned taking forward UK-Taiwan expert health dialogues, while Conservative backbencher Richard Graham spoke about the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which he chairs, scoping out a project in Taiwan.
It will be interesting to watch how these plans develop.
None of this guarantees that Britain will be a leading supporter of Taiwan in the years ahead, but a more engaged and informed parliament surely makes this a more likely prospect. Particularly when Taiwan is attracting the attention of leading figures on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and from the Labour and Conservative benches.
Hopefully, this trend continues the next time British-Taiwan relations are discussed in parliament, but it had better not be a five-year wait for the next time.
Gray Sergeant is a British writer focusing on East Asian politics.
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