Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s WeChat account, which was opened in 2019 for direct communication with Chinese-Australians prior to an election, was hijacked in October last year, with the account name changed from ScottMorrison2019 to Aus-Chinese New Living, and began posting pro-China political propaganda.
Since as early as July last year, Morrison and his assistants have been unable to log in to the account. Repeated attempts to contact WeChat owner Tencent Holdings Ltd to retrieve the account were unsuccessful, with all e-mails going unanswered.
However, the account of an Australian lawmaker who recently criticized Morrison for “spreading lies” about a pathogen test was not affected.
Australian experts have criticized the Chinese government for blatantly imposing censorship outside of China and interfering with Australia’s democratic system.
It has long been known that China uses applications to publish disinformation and collect personal data, and even the official app of the Beijing Winter Olympics has security concerns. WeChat has also been a source of disinformation and China’s tool to spy on and manipulate people overseas.
That even the accounts of foreign heads of state can be manipulated speaks of a special kind of arrogance, in which Australia was effectively being treated as a vassal state.
This not only disregards diplomatic etiquette and the international order, it also proves once again that China has absolute control over all Chinese companies, especially the digital technology industry, and that Chinese are not the only ones being monitored.
It was revealed on Jan. 13 that alleged Chinese agent Christine Lee (李貞駒) “knowingly engaged in political interference activities” inside the British parliament.
These examples show that China’s infiltration tactics have become multidimensional, penetrating every aspect of the world in different ways, allowing China to export its influence abroad.
Not only WeChat, but other Chinese apps such as TikTok, Xiaohongshu (also known as Little Red Book) and iQIYI have penetrated the Taiwanese market, attracting large numbers of users. The iQIYI platform has the third-largest market share of all over-the-top media services, even after having been banned in Taiwan.
This shows that Taiwan not only has insufficient legal and regulatory resistance against such infiltration, but the apps’ users do not mind being bugged and having their personal data stolen. This is the primary concern.
The invasion of these Chinese apps not only breaches Taiwan’s national defense, it also harms Taiwanese industries. Chinese groups with considerable capital can expand their businesses quickly in Taiwan through puppet organizations, marginalizing local competitors, stifling local businesses and monopolizing the market.
This pattern is replicated across many industries. As interest groups become powerful, and political and business relationships become entangled, China could eventually become able to annex Taiwan without sending a single soldier.
In addition to votes, banknotes can also be used to defend sovereignty, to counter infiltration and to revitalize local industries. Everyone can do their bit to help stop China’s bad money from driving out Taiwan’s good.
Hong Tsun-ming is director of the Taiwan Statebuilding Party’s Yilan County branch.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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