The European Parliament last week passed a nonbinding resolution condemning the deterioration of human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, and called for a review of the territory’s WTO membership. The resolution signals Hong Kong’s diminishing role as a non-sovereign entity.
What is most striking is the dead silence of the territory’s leadership. Anxiety and insecurity best describe the mood of the ruling elite as they contemplate the end of Hong Kong’s glory days as a financial hub.
In the past, senior Hong Kong officials were quick to criticize the West for its hypocrisy and failings to project a nationalistic image. When former US president Donald Trump revoked the territory’s special trade status in June 2020, Hong Kong authorities used patriotic rhetoric to downplay its devastating effects.
The world is questioning Hong Kong’s non-sovereign status because of its deteriorating autonomy and rising frustrations against political injustices.
China’s national security arrangement has rapidly changed Hong Kong’s governing order since 2020. It suspended the “one country, two systems” experiment that was set to expire in 2047. As the scope of the security laws continue to evolve, Hong Kongers have experienced a profound change in daily life.
People see hostile government interventions in shutting down civic organizations and media companies, persecuting democracy advocates and journalists, and censoring academia and dissent. The forced closure of the Apple Daily and other independent media sent a chilling message to the press to self-censor reporting on corruption, abuses of power and police brutality.
Without legal protection for everyone, local businesses, universities and civic sectors are finding it impossible to operate in a free and open environment.
Another layer of change comes from below. Hong Kongers appreciate the benefits of enduring bilateral links with the EU and other nations with respect to consular affairs, visa arrangements and legal services, as well as cultural and educational exchanges.
For years, Hong Kong sought “paradiplomacy” in the international domain, with memberships in the WTO, the WHO, APEC, IMF and the Financial Task Force on Money Laundering. The territory has numerous economic and trade offices worldwide to facilitate free-trade discussion, lobby foreign officials and promote its business interests abroad.
Keeping Hong Kong’s non-sovereign integrity has made the territory what it is today: a vibrant financial hub thanks to its openness, transparent regulatory environment, and commitment to the rule of law and civic liberties.
Yet everything has changed in this new era of securitization. Local officials perceive regular political, economic and social matters through the lens of national security, and employ extrajudicial measures against Hong Kongers who try to exercise their rights. When the national security order overrides the rules-based governance structure, Hong Kong is no different from any Chinese territory.
Because longstanding ties with foreign countries only benefit the privileged few at the expense of everyone, there is widespread support to end Hong Kong’s official participation in international bodies and to sanction those officials responsible for smothering the territory’s freedom.
Europe has taken the lead in debating the merits of treating Hong Kong as a subnational entity in global trade. Taiwan and other allies might follow in the same footsteps.
In light of this international effort to adjust Hong Kong’s special status, only time will tell whether the territory’s leadership can demonstrate significant progress in democratic governance and human rights protection.
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is a professor of history at Pace University in New York City.
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