Hot on the heels of a statement of US congressional support for the defense of Taiwan, US President Joe Biden on Monday last week signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law, which recommends that the US Department of Defense invites Taiwan to this year’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.
The act also calls on the department to assist Taiwan in bolstering its self-defense capability.
Started in 1977 and held every two years, RIMPAC is the world’s largest international maritime warfare exercise and is administered by US forces based at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
Since 2012, more than 20 nations have participated in each RIMPAC exercise. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) participated in the exercise for the first time in 2014 and was invited again in 2016.
However, Beijing’s aggressive expansion of its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea has significantly destabilized the Asia-Pacific region and strained the US-China relationship, causing Washington to not invite China to participate in any further editions.
Although Taiwan’s military has to date been unable to formally attend the exercises, it has in the past dispatched high-ranking officers to attend as “observers.”
If Taiwan were able to formally participate in, and send naval warships to, this year’s RIMPAC exercise, it would represent a significant breakthrough in the nation’s foreign military exchanges.
The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is not just a regional problem, but concerns every member of the global community. Maintaining peace in the Strait cannot be achieved through Taiwan-US bilateral military cooperation alone, but should be approached from a global strategic perspective.
Taiwan should engage with friendly nations in the region and work toward establishing substantive military-to-military exchanges.
To achieve this aim, the government should seek Washington’s support to participate in any multinational military exercise that is geared toward upholding regional peace or providing humanitarian assistance. This year’s RIMPAC exercise presents an ideal opportunity to achieve this goal.
Taiwan’s full participation in the event would not only allow its military to integrate its operational concepts with the US and other foreign militaries, but would also take Taiwan a step closer toward achieving substantive military alliances with participating nations.
During the past two decades, Japan and Australia have become regular RIMPAC participants, and both have entered into separate military alliances with the US: Tokyo established the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the US and Japan, and Canberra struck the AUKUS trilateral pact with the US and the UK.
Taiwan should therefore be seeking opportunities to engage in military cooperation with Japan and Australia, in addition to the US.
The primary purpose of RIMPAC is to develop a joint operational capability between the navies of participating nations for the purpose of carrying out multinational maritime missions and to ensure that a collective response can be mobilized to counter the full gamut of maritime threats.
The RIMPAC exercise consists of three phases.
Phase 1 is an “in-port” exercise, phase 2 covers “force integration” and phase 3 comprises a series of scenario-driven “free” exercises. Phases 2 and 3 include live-fire gunnery and missile exercises, maritime interdiction and vessel boardings, anti-surface warfare, undersea warfare, naval maneuvers and air-defense exercises.
Local media reported that the Ministry of National Defense has initiated a “comprehensive English conversion” program, which has been introduced to a select group of navy personnel, in anticipation of Taiwan being invited to participate in this year’s exercise.
If Taiwan receives an invitation from Washington, the navy would be fully prepared to take part.
Expanding regional security and cooperation is a vital objective of Taiwan’s national defense strategy. If Taiwan is able to participate in this year’s RIMPAC, it would not only provide the military with an enhanced level of training, but would also assist in elevating its warfighting interoperability.
Moreover, as a vital security partner within the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, Taiwan’s participation in this year’s exercise, which is administered by the US Indo-Pacific Command, would have global strategic significance by demonstrating Taiwan’s substantial contribution to upholding peace and security in the region.
Yao Chung-yuan is a professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s strategic planning department.
Translated by Edward Jones
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