During a meeting with a group of high-school students late last month, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) suggested replacing the English subject portion of the General Scholastic Ability Test (GSAT) with an English proficiency test, which has generated a lot of discussion.
It is unclear whether Tsai made the remarks on the spur of the moment or whether they were the result of long-term deliberation. The question is: Would her proposed changes be feasible in education in Taiwan?
It is undeniable that Taiwanese English tests emphasize reading and writing over listening and speaking, which are definitely weak spots for most students. Language is a tool of communication and, over the long run, if Taiwan wants to become a bilingual nation, fundamental changes need to be introduced in the education system.
As instruction is oriented toward exams, if the content of tests remain unchanged, students would still be able to score high on reading and writing simply by practicing sample questions from previous exams, memorizing vocabulary and phrases, focusing on grammar. In that case, it might be unrealistic to ask them to emphasize more pragmatic listening and speaking skills.
Apart from creating an immersive environment for English acquisition, changing test methods and content is a direction that deserves discussion, which Tsai might have sought to spark.
Education needs a long-term plan that cannot be changed on a whim. In response to public concerns over Tsai’s proposal, Minister of Education Pan Wen-chung (潘文忠) said that the joint college entrance exam would remain unchanged next year.
What should happen then? Should Taiwan follow global trends by introducing changes to its education system? What about issues of fairness?
The government should consider the opinions of teachers, parents and students when creating a long-term plan, and there should be a “transitional period.” This would be the right way to reform the system.
First, the most pragmatic issue is money. Tsai said that if the new policy is adopted, students could take the English proficiency test “any time.” This would relieve the pressure of having to perform well in an all-determining test, as a student’s future would no longer be determined by a single exam. On the other hand, economically disadvantaged students would have fewer opportunities to take the test than their better-off peers.
The registration fee for a Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC), for example, is NT$1,600, compared with NT$560 for a beginner-level General English Proficiency Test (GEPT). This means that TOEIC is three times more expensive than GEPT. For economically disadvantaged households, their children can hardly afford to take an English proficiency test “any time.” Even if the government could provide subsidies for their first test, what about the second or third tests? So the question of fairness is likely to come up.
Besides, exactly which English proficiency test should the government adopt: TOEIC, GEPT or something else? Under such circumstances, would students “put the cart before the horse” by giving up English classes in school to prepare for a proficiency test?
The issue of instruction being exam-led is a result of “credentialism.” As Taiwan reforms the joint college entrance exam system, authorities should not switch back and forth, and keep changing their minds. With a look at the system over the past few years, after constant adjustment and fine-tuning, teachers, parents and students have experienced chaos.
Despite Tsai’s good intentions, any changes should not be implemented rashly without complementary measures.
Bob Chiu is a junior-high school teacher.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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