In an Oct. 31 interview, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “The United States will follow the Taiwan Relations Act to ensure Taiwan’s self-defense and will not allow any party to take unilateral actions to break the status quo.”
This seems different from US President Joe Biden’s declaration that “we have a commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.”
However, a comparison of Blinken’s comment with a speech that he made on April 11 shows consistency. The US will continue to support the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues.
Any attempt to change the “status quo” by force would be a serious mistake, Blinken said on April 11.
However, he has not answered the hypothetical question of whether the US would send troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
Does Biden’s phrase “assist the defense of Taiwan” mean that the US’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” has moved toward “strategic clarity”?
For the US, the greatest common denominator for conflict management across the Taiwan Strait is to oppose any unilateral change to the “status quo” under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act, the “six assurances” and the Three Joint Communiques.
This is also the long-standing consensus between the Democratic and Republican parties in the US.
“Strategic ambiguity” is to constrain Beijing from taking unilateral military action to achieve unification with Taiwan and to prevent Taiwan from unilaterally declaring independence. The US has always used “strategic ambiguity” to form a delicate balance between Taiwan and China.
When the US Department of State speaks, it must consider the stakes at all levels of diplomacy, so it sometimes adopts a neutral or vague stance in striving for the largest operational flexibility.
In other words, a consideration of the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the domestic consensus in the US prompts the department to adopt a more neutral statement, which is: “resolutely oppose any unilateral change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”
Biden’s main target audience for his remarks on “assisting in defense of Taiwan” are Americans, US allies — including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea — and the national leader of the CCP.
Regarding Americans, Biden’s aim is to express his stance on China and continue to attract the support of people who harbor anti-Chinese sentiments.
Regarding Taiwan, his aim is to affirm the US’ security commitment and to bolster the confidence of regional allies — Japan, South Korea and others in the Indo-Pacific region — that the US will honor its security assurances.
Regarding the CCP, his aim is nothing more than to urge it not to misjudge the situation and act rashly.
However, Washington must maintain an overwhelming military advantage over Beijing for “strategic ambiguity” to be effective.
When the US military is challenged by the escalating capabilities of the Chinese military — leaving “strategic ambiguity” unsustainable — Washington might move toward “dual strategic clarity,” meaning that it would separately indicate possible actions if either party unilaterally changes the “status quo.”
However, to preserve flexibility in its tactical response, the US could add a new policy of “tactical ambiguity” to its diplomatic repertoire.
Jeff Sheng is chief researcher at the American Chamber of Commerce in Kaohsiung.
Two sets of economic data released last week by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) have drawn mixed reactions from the public: One on the nation’s economic performance in the first quarter of the year and the other on Taiwan’s household wealth distribution in 2021. GDP growth for the first quarter was faster than expected, at 6.51 percent year-on-year, an acceleration from the previous quarter’s 4.93 percent and higher than the agency’s February estimate of 5.92 percent. It was also the highest growth since the second quarter of 2021, when the economy expanded 8.07 percent, DGBAS data showed. The growth
In the intricate ballet of geopolitics, names signify more than mere identification: They embody history, culture and sovereignty. The recent decision by China to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as “Tsang Nan” or South Tibet, and to rename Tibet as “Xizang,” is a strategic move that extends beyond cartography into the realm of diplomatic signaling. This op-ed explores the implications of these actions and India’s potential response. Names are potent symbols in international relations, encapsulating the essence of a nation’s stance on territorial disputes. China’s choice to rename regions within Indian territory is not merely a linguistic exercise, but a symbolic assertion
More than seven months into the armed conflict in Gaza, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take “immediate and effective measures” to protect Palestinians in Gaza from the risk of genocide following a case brought by South Africa regarding Israel’s breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The international community, including Amnesty International, called for an immediate ceasefire by all parties to prevent further loss of civilian lives and to ensure access to life-saving aid. Several protests have been organized around the world, including at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and many other universities in the US.
In the 2022 book Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, academics Hal Brands and Michael Beckley warned, against conventional wisdom, that it was not a rising China that the US and its allies had to fear, but a declining China. This is because “peaking powers” — nations at the peak of their relative power and staring over the precipice of decline — are particularly dangerous, as they might believe they only have a narrow window of opportunity to grab what they can before decline sets in, they said. The tailwinds that propelled China’s spectacular economic rise over the past