A Taiwanese trade delegation visiting Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania has touted its dazzling achievements, but sustaining the momentum of mutual interest requires solid plans.
The delegation signed seven memorandums of understanding (MOU) in Slovakia, five in the Czech Republic and six in Lithuania during its trip from Oct. 20 to yesterday, the National Development Council said.
The MOUs aim to promote cooperation in electric vehicle manufacturing, space technology, business digitalization, tourism, science park cooperation, cybersecurity, catalyst technology, green energy, smart machinery, semiconductors, biotechnology, finance and so forth, the council said.
However, it is questionable how many of the MOUs can yield concrete results.
The government reportedly began drafting the delegation’s itinerary about two months ago, after the European countries donated COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan, and after Beijing began pressing Lithuania to drop its plan for a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius.
The delegation’s itinerary was kept separate from that of Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), as his visits to Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Brussels at about the same time involved greater political considerations.
Following their trip, the members of the trade delegation should assess whether they understand the needs of the countries they visited and how to foster future cooperation.
For example, Czech and Lithuanian officials have expressed hope that Taiwanese semiconductor suppliers would open production facilities in their countries. While some Taiwanese electronics companies such as Foxconn Technology Group and Delta Electronics have invested in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, countries in the region are obviously anticipating more.
While the government might not be able to intervene in a private company’s investment plans, it should work with host countries to reduce potential barriers and increase incentives for investors to those countries.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) in July said it was considering to open a factory in Germany. While the plan seems not yet finalized, Silicon Saxony, a semiconductor cluster in Dresden, Germany, might be the most practical location. If that is true, TSMC might bring new suppliers to the region, as Saxony is close to Germany’s borders with the Czech Republic and Poland.
While opening a new factory might need more planning, some smaller steps can be taken to facilitate personal interactions and goods transportation.
During his visit to Taiwan as part of Czech Senate President Milos Vystrcil’s delegation last year, Prague Mayor Zdenek Hrib said that he met with China Airlines chairman Hsieh Shih-chien (謝世謙), and that Hsieh expressed support for direct flights between Taipei and Prague.
However, the issue seems to have been shelved, and the airline played no role in the Taiwanese trade delegation’s trip.
Following the Czech delegation’s visit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also listed 22 achievements of bilateral interactions, including several MOUs that were signed. The two countries have indeed become closer in politics, but it is unclear how these MOUs help promote cooperation.
Some European countries have expressed their disappointment over Beijing’s empty promises in boosting investment and infrastructure. Knowing this, Taiwan should make itself a trustworthy partner and avoid making hollow promises.
Perhaps the government could start by using more than MOUs to prove its sincerity.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS