In response to the increasing military threat posed by China, the Ministry of National Defense years ago began funding research to develop indigenous ballistic and cruise missile capabilities.
During a joint meeting of the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee and Finance Committee on Wednesday last week, Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) for the first time publicly acknowledged the existence of the Yun Feng (雲峰, Cloud Peak) medium-range surface-to-surface missile program.
However, when asked if the missile had a range of 1,200km, he declined to provide further details in a public forum, and said he would let the committee members know in private.
Chiu was also asked whether the missile was still in development, to which he said that the military is “working on it.”
Due to unique circumstances in the Taiwan Strait, preparation and deployment of the Yun Feng missile should take into account three conditions:
First, as medium-range missiles are sensitive equipment, they would likely be classified as a strategic deterrent weapon by medium and small nations. It is therefore essential that the missile’s delivery vehicles are highly mobile to prevent the enemy from destroying them in a first strike.
If conflict with China were to occur, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army could be expected to attack Taiwan at a relatively high tempo. Consequently, Taiwan’s medium-range missiles and other special missiles should be equipped with mobile deployment capabilities to ensure that the nation can launch an effective counterstrike.
Second, although medium-range and cruise missiles are categorized as “strategic units” by the military, as Taiwan would not strike first, the missiles would only have second-strike capability.
If Taiwan were to fire its missiles first during the initial stages of a conflict with China, it would likely make it much more difficult to garner support and assistance from allies and sympathetic nations.
Third, the deployment of Yun Feng medium-range missiles would likely be tasked to the army, which could deploy them in fixed underground positions. Alternatively, it might embed the majority of the missiles within mobile units.
The military could also deploy the missiles on cargo ships during peacetime. If war were to break out, the ships could leave harbor and be strategically deployed at sea, increasing the flexibility of Taiwan’s missile deployment.
If fired at sea, this would make it much more difficult for China to obtain intelligence on a missile’s location before it was launched, thereby significantly augmenting Taiwan’s asymmetric combat capability.
Missiles are considered offensive and defensive weapons. If the Yun Feng medium-range missile program is successful, producing several hundred of them should not be a problem, significantly increasing the nation’s attack and defense capabilities.
The optimum solution would be to integrate them into ground-based mobile units and, during a war, at sea.
This would increase the defensive cost for China, while simultaneously reducing Taiwan’s defense burden.
Ray Song is a graduate of National Chung Cheng University’s Institute of Strategic and International Affairs.
Translated by Edward Jones
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