Even though there is no formal diplomatic relationship or direct military cooperation between Taiwan and Japan, as China increasingly threatens Taiwan militarily, Tokyo might pass laws and publish official documents with the aim of developing multilateral joint defense cooperation with Taipei.
This could take the form of a US-Japan-Taiwan military alliance, which would strengthen bilateral cooperation between Taipei and Tokyo, so that the two nations could work closely together to uphold regional peace and security.
In an interview with the Financial Times published on Aug. 2, titled “Japan calls for greater attention to survival of Taiwan,” Japanese Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi warned about the expanding Chinese military encircling Taiwan and called on the international community to pay greater attention to Taiwan’s survival.
Kishi also said that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait is tipping in favor of China and that the only way that peace will prevail is if the international community robustly demands it.
He also stressed the importance of the relationship with Taiwan, which he noted is only 110km from the westernmost point of Japan.
Tokyo has over the past few months shown a marked increase in interest and concern over the situation in the Taiwan Strait.
Japan has participated in a series of diplomatic conclaves, all of which have resulted in joint statements or joint communiques that have emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Strait. This includes the “two-plus-two meeting” in Washington in March, the Japan-US Summit Meeting in April, the EU-Japan Summit in May, the Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation and the G7 Leaders’ Summit in June, as well as the publication of Japan’s annual defense white paper last month.
The continued expansion of Chinese military power has over the past few years not only created an existential threat to Taiwan, but also seriously affected Japan’s security. As early as 2004, a Chinese navy submarine intruded into Japanese sovereign waters, and the following year, five navy surface vessels forcibly entered waters in close proximity to the Chunxiao (春曉) gas field in the East China Sea, unsettling Tokyo.
Since then, Beijing has more frequently displayed shows of strength to Japan, particularly near the disputed Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, which had the effect of further alerting Tokyo to the burgeoning China threat.
As of the end of last month, Chinese-flagged vessels have for 152 consecutive days cruised through the Diaoyutais’ contiguous zone, setting a new record.
Tokyo is acutely aware of Taiwan’s vital strategic importance in East Asia and knows full well that if Taiwan, with its pivotal position in the first island chain, no longer functions as a counter to Chinese military expansion, Beijing will almost inevitably become the military hegemon in the region.
In other words, Japan’s and Taiwan’s national security are closely related: Taiwan’s problem is Japan’s problem.
In addition to the US-Japan military alliance, the international community must squarely face up to the situation and assist Taiwan to bolster its self-defense capabilities to defend against the China threat.
Beijing’s threatening military maneuvers against Taiwan have caused the world to belatedly wake up to the severity of the problem. If the Strait becomes increasingly unstable, it would endanger the security of the entire region.
As Taiwan and Japan’s militaries both use a large amount of US-made systems, the potential for seamless interoperability presents an opening for strategic cooperation.
Japan should use the operational framework of the Japan-US military alliance and Taiwan-US military cooperation, and consider taking a leaf out of Washington’s flexible “one China” policy to emulate something similar to the US’ Taiwan Relations Act and deepen military cooperation with Taiwan.
This would allow the two nations to collectively respond to the China threat and contribute to the international effort to secure a peaceful and stable Strait and Indo-Pacific region.
Yao Chung-yuan is a professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s strategic planning department.
Translated by Edward Jones
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