The US House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 15 introduced the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act.
The act, if passed by the US Congress, would provide powerful support for Taiwan, including a requirement that the US secretary of state enter negotiations with the Taiwan Council for US Affairs to rename the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington to the “Taiwan Representative Office.”
The effort to rename Taiwan’s representative office in Washington has long been a priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) US diplomats. Taiwanese based in the US, as well as Taiwanese lobbying groups, have expended a great deal of money and effort over the years, diligently working toward this goal.
With the relationship between Taiwan and the US riding high, this presents a golden opportunity for advocates in Washington and Taipei to seize the initiative and rename Taiwan’s representative office.
Washington breaking off formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979 marked Taiwan’s lowest point on the international stage. At the time, I had just taken the national civil service exam and entered MOFA’s ranks as a fresh recruit with the Department for US Affairs. The Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the US Senate in April that year, established the American Institute in Taiwan.
The Executive Yuan reciprocated by establishing the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to handle non-official relations with its estranged ally.
However, many Taiwanese were confused by its name and could not comprehend the role or function of this new organization.
In 1994, the administration of US president Bill Clinton carried out a review of policy regarding Taiwan. One of the requirements stemming from the review was that Taiwan’s representative office in Washington change its name to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, which is still in use to this day.
However, the Taipei headquarters continued to be called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs up until August 2019, when it was renamed the Taiwan Council for US Affairs. Following four decades of glacial progress, a few tentative steps were taken toward reflecting reality.
It is yet to be seen whether the EAGLE Act, the latest in a line of Taiwan-friendly legislation proposed by the US House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs, becomes law, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of continued universal cross-party congressional support for Taiwan.
This precious support, which began with the administration of former US president Donald Trump and has continued under US President Joe Biden, is founded upon several facets: the US’ Indo-Pacific geopolitical strategy, core trust, economic cooperation and high-tech supply chains. Deepening trust and solidifying the “rock solid” relationship between the two countries requires consistency, continuity and predictability. Taiwan should take advantage of the warming relationship to push for the renaming of its representative offices.
Among high-level officials in the Biden administration responsible for setting the US’ Taiwan policy — whether working for the White House, National Security Council, Department of State or other government departments — there is no shortage of sober and rational people who, if not “pro-Taiwan,” then at least have an intimate understanding of Taiwan and its geostrategic importance.
While such people take the US national interest as a starting point, they are familiar with the Indo-Pacific region and the complex triangular relationship between Taiwan, China, and the US. For this reason, they do not engage in wishful thinking nor make emotional judgments.
Renaming Taiwan’s representative office in Washington would not only reflect reality and the current state of affairs, recognizing the significant relaxation of contact restrictions, it would also reflect the greater decisionmaking space in Washington and the increased appetite for resisting pressure from Beijing. Additionally, cross-party support in Congress bolsters the argument for renaming the representative office.
In 1995, I took over as director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Atlanta. We sent out invitations, written in English, for the traditional Double Ten National Day banquet with “Taiwan” appended to “Republic of China (ROC).” This caused a sensation back home. I received a severe dressing down from my superiors and was promptly transferred to another post. This was the only time I received disciplinary action during my four decades in Taiwan’s diplomatic corps. To this day, I have a clear conscience and bear no grudge.
At the time, I was criticized for causing a diplomatic incident, “using verbal sophistry and twisted logic,” and for being “unrepentant.”
A general order was issued to all of Taiwan’s representative offices around the world, which stated that if important dignitaries or other local individuals are uncertain about the distinction between the ROC and the People’s Republic of China, and require the addition of “Taiwan” to clarify that “this China” is not the “other China,” the representative office need not have dealings with such ill-informed people or invite them to representative office functions in the future.
For the past quarter of a century, the argument has been made that “the time is not right” or that it would be “politically incorrect” to rename Taiwan’s representative office in Washington.
My intention regarding the Double Ten National Day banquets was merely to highlight Taiwan’s view. Today, all of Taiwan’s representative offices and civic organizations enthusiastically employ creative methods to promote Taiwan as a democratic partner, charitable nation and force for good around the world.
Taiwan is an independent and sovereign nation whose official name, according to the Constitution, is the Republic of China. As the nation navigates the international stage and strives to elevate its status among countries with whom Taiwan does not have a formal diplomatic relationship — of which the US is the most important barometer — the time is right, after more than 40 years, to respect the dignity of our distinct identity and rename our representative office in Washington the “Taiwan Representative Office.”
Stanley Kao was Taiwan’s representative to the US from 2016 to 2020.
Translated by Edward Jones
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS