Since the Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched their diplomatic relationship from Taipei to Beijing in September 2019, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not been able to poach any more of Taiwan’s allies in what would soon become a complete two-year period.
This development is significant when taking into consideration that over just about three years after President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) government had used its economic resources to get seven allies of Taiwan to switch recognition.
Several factors have played a role in this “grace period” for Taiwan. For starters, former US president Donald Trump’s “trade war” occupied most of the Chinese government’s attention for a while, and before it could even appropriately deal with this dispute, the CCP faced months of escalating protests in Hong Kong that culminated in the implementation of a National Security Law in the territory, which drew condemnation from the international community.
As if this was not enough, a once-in-a-century pandemic emerged from central China’s Wuhan, forcing the world to stop operating as usual, with Beijing taking a lot of heat for its lack of candor and overall handling of the crisis.
All of this generated an anti-China sentiment that was amplified by Trump and prompted the US government to adopt measures that were without a doubt welcome developments to Taiwan, such as the approval of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, which took effect in March last year.
The act allows the US Department of State to alter its economic, diplomatic and security engagements with any country that decides to rescind its relationship with Taiwan in search of closer ties with the Chinese government, and given that since its approval no other countries have opted for such a change, it can be said that the legislation has been quite effective to deter further defections.
This does not mean that the Chinese government has stopped making efforts to isolate Taiwan on the international stage. Despite all of its contributions to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan has yet to secure a spot as an observer at the World Health Assembly due to China’s objections. This unfair exclusion has continued even when the nation’s powerful allies like the US, the EU and Japan have made statements in support of its inclusion.
China has also put pressure on Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and as it could be observed in the past few months, the biggest threat to the nation’s diplomatic ties did not come from the prospect of economic incentives or loans, as it was in the past, but in the form of so-called “vaccine diplomacy.”
The first episode took place when Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benitez issued a statement saying that his government was willing to purchase COVID-19 vaccines from any country as long as there were no conditions regarding diplomatic relations if the vaccines were purchased from China.
This came after weeks of rumors regarding a possible switch of ties from the South American country. In the end, the incident did not mean much, and after Paraguay secured a significant amount of vaccines from an Indian manufacturer, Taiwan and Paraguay publicly reaffirmed their strong ties.
The second episode came not much later when rumors about a possible switch by Honduras emerged. A few days later, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez announced that to secure the much needed medication, his government would be willing to open a commercial office in China, if that was what was best for Hondurans.
Days after the statement, the US said it would soon begin to export about 80 million vaccine doses, and the situation seems to have since gotten under control. Neither of these incidents resulted in a rupture between Taiwan and its allies.
However, given that vaccines have been Taiwan’s only real reason for concern of a diplomatic rupture over the past few months and that Tsai has announced that two local vaccines will start to be manufactured at the end of July, the government must begin to think of a strategy to continue to help other countries around the world, while also taking into consideration what is best for Taiwan’s national interest.
Taiwan’s first priority must of course be to protect its population. To this effect, the government has inked several agreements to purchase 20 million vaccine doses, just 10 million short of what is needed to reach a vaccination rate of 60 percent, which is required to reach herd immunity. This gives reason to believe that the exportation of Taiwanese-made vaccines will most likely start shortly after production begins.
To prevent China from trying to use vaccines to lure countries into making the switch, Taiwan’s allies should be given priority for receiving locally produced jabs. Making the vaccines available for them as soon as possible will not only bolster diplomatic ties from a government-to-government perspective, but unlike economic donations, vaccines and other medical supplies have a strong psychological effect on those receiving them.
This is because these supplies are something that regular people can directly see and benefit from, unlike when the aid comes in the form of a preferential loan or a donation that gets diluted in government bureaucracy.
This kind of donation has the potential to sway public opinion in favor of Taiwan for a long time, regardless of whether a Taiwan-friendly political party is in power. It is an opportunity that Taiwan must make the best of.
Priority must also be given to countries like India, which is dealing with a devastating second wave of COVID-19. Given the alarming situation in the South Asian country, to which Taiwan recently donated several oxygen concentrators, cylinders and cryogenic tankers, the government must not forget that Indian vaccines helped solve Paraguayan constraints, so India should be given priority as well.
The rest of the world must follow, because vaccine distribution will most likely remain a challenge for the rest of the year, and it is uncertain how long the protection of the vaccines against the virus will last.
This is not to say that Taiwan should weaponize vaccine distribution efforts once large-scale manufacturing begins — no life-saving supply should be weaponized — but if other countries are willing to engage in such practices, Taiwan must be smart and use its resources in a way that does not only allow it to stay true to its humanitarian values, but to protect itself from actors that will try to take advantage of any situation to obtain leverage.
Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran lawyer residing in Taiwan. He has a master’s degree in business administration.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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