On Friday last week, US President Joe Biden held a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the “Quad,” with the leaders of Australia, India and Japan, to discuss important issues in the Indo-Pacific region, the security situation within the region and the future of US-China relations. Its significance should not be overlooked.
The Biden administration, regarding the US’ national security strategy, has maintained that China is the US’ greatest challenge.
Not only has Biden continued the Quad mechanism that was resurrected during the administration of former US president Donald Trump, he announced not long after taking office that it was to be elevated for the first time to a leaders’ meeting, to reinforce its influence and significance.
That is an indication of just how seriously the US regards the Indo-Pacific region and its relations with its allies.
This Biden administration initiative has already begun to bear fruit, and has given considerable encouragement to US allies in the region.
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, who has recently borne the brunt of Beijing’s bullying tactics, called the meeting “a historic moment,” and said that “when governments come together at the highest level, this shows a whole new level of cooperation to create a new anchor for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.”
That the leaders of Australia, India and Japan, three major countries in the Indo-Pacific region, were willing to come together at the US’ behest, also demonstrates that these countries agree with the US’ security rationale and are willing to strengthen their cooperation with the US. It has been a diplomatic success for the Biden administration.
Although one of the main reasons that Biden called the meeting was to deal with the challenge presented by China’s rise, it was billed as a discussion on how to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, with no direct mention of the China threat being made. There are several reasons for this.
First, the pandemic and climate change are imminent threats to the Indo-Pacific region, while China’s rise is considered a long-term challenge that did not necessarily need to be broached in the first Quad leaders’ meeting.
Second, the US still wants to develop a cooperative relationship with China, and the diplomatic summit in Alaska had already been organized for talks between the US and China, so the issue of China did not really need to be overemphasized.
Third, other participants at the meeting, especially India and Japan, did not want to increase tensions with China, and were wary of letting the outside world think that the sole objective of the Quad meeting was to think of ways to constrain China’s rise.
Despite the meeting not listing the China challenge as its main concern, it would have been difficult not to broach the issue.
After the meeting, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said that the four leaders had discussed the challenge posed by China, and had made it clear that “none of them have any illusions” about Beijing.
For example, even though the leaders were discussing how to eradicate COVID-19 from the Indo-Pacific region, they had not invited China, a country that has the capability to manufacture its own vaccine, to join the talks, and decided that the Quad would help India increase production of vaccines, combining US technology, US and Japanese investment and Australian logistical support, hoping to provide 1 billion doses by the end of next year to countries in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and Pacific islands.
This was clearly an attempt to combine the efforts of the four countries to compete with China in the international provision of vaccines, to win the goodwill of poorer nations in the Indo-Pacific region and to suppress China’s diplomatic and economic influence.
During the meeting they also decided to establish a technology task force to scrutinize semiconductor supply chains, and looked at the cyberattacks the four participating nations had been subjected to, which was clearly aimed at defending themselves against China.
After the meeting, Sullivan said that the Quad is not a military alliance, nor is it a new NATO. This was an attempt to put Beijing’s mind at ease and to prevent the Indo-Pacific region from descending into an overt cold war.
The Quad meeting represents the Biden administration’s opening diplomatic sally in the Indo-Pacific, and was successful in securing the cooperation of the four countries in exerting their soft power against China. The Quad is sure to continue to affect the security situation in this region.
Wang Kao-cheng is a professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
RSS