US President Joe Biden’s conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and his announced foreign policies show that, in addition to military and ideological opposition and containment, the US’ competitive strategy toward China includes suppression of high tech and trade competition, and cooperation in selected areas.
The main focus is to maintain peace, liberty and openness in the Indo-Pacific region, resulting in the Biden administration calling on Taiwan and China to engage in meaningful dialogue.
Given the new relationships among Taiwan, the US and China since Biden’s inauguration, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has made adjustments to the national security team, and is striving toward cross-strait and regional peace, backed up by improved national defense capabilities.
The question is how Taiwan can engage in dialogue with China when they do not have equal international standing. Furthermore, the only goal of China’s Taiwan policy is to annex Taiwan and it relentlessly demands that Taiwan accept a “one China” consensus.
Surely the US government knows that China is unwilling to accept the political reality of the Republic of China on Taiwan and looks on Taiwan as a local government that it expects to annex.
As the US fears a war in the Taiwan Strait and wants the two sides to engage in dialogue, it must recognize Taiwan diplomatically and help it to join the UN. That is the only way that Taiwan’s international standing can equal China’s and the two countries can engage in talks on cross-strait peace.
When US Department of State spokesman Ned Price urged cross-strait dialogue, he referred to “meaningful dialogue with Taiwan’s democratically elected representatives” — a far cry from former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s “Taiwan’s president.”
Even if the US government fears igniting a war across the Taiwan Strait and refuses to amend its “one China” policy — and the view that Taiwan is part of China — it should not belittle Taiwan’s national status and sovereignty in this way.
Taiwan understands that the US refers to the nation in this way because it does not want to use the provocative language of former US president Donald Trump, intensifying US-China opposition and hindering implementation of its China strategy.
The Biden administration knows that China and Taiwan are separately ruled, so addressing Taiwan’s leader in this way ignores that its popularly elected president represents a democratic nation and diminishes it to a local government.
This shows that although the Biden administration continues Trump’s China policy, it has reverted to the ambiguity of former US president Barack Obama’s administration regarding Taiwanese sovereignty — merely considering Taiwan as a political entity helpful for containing China, but avoiding the political reality that it is a sovereign nation that does not belong to China.
The department’s statement has given China the opportunity to demand that the US urge Taiwan to accept a “one China” consensus and paved the way for annexing Taiwan on the excuse that peace in the Taiwan Strait is beneficial to the US’ western Pacific policy interests.
As US-China tensions and the competition-cooperation mix continues, the two nations’ dealings on issues such as climate change, public health and nuclear arms deterrence might bring the US back toward shared control of the Strait with China and giving in to Beijing’s demands — which would hamper Taiwan’s protection of its de facto sovereignty.
Based on the principles of mutual benefit and coexistence, the national security team must find ways to urge the US to face up to the reality that Taiwan is a sovereign nation.
Michael Lin is a retired diplomat who served in the US.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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