Since the US Department of State lifted the US’ self-imposed restrictions on contacts between US officials and their Taiwanese counterparts, Taiwan has once again become a focus of the international media. Among recent media coverage, two articles, from the US and the UK, are particularly worth attention, as they reveal that the change in the White House is leading to a shift in the international community’s attitude toward Taiwan.
The first article is an interview with former US secretary of state Rex Tillerson published in Foreign Policy.
Tillerson in the interview said that China is the biggest worry for the administration of US President Joe Biden.
Tillerson expressed concern that a military conflict with China might arise within a decade — when China makes the move to annex Taiwan by force, as this is what Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has been preparing for a long time.
The increasingly frequent incursions of Chinese military aircraft into Taiwan’s south-western air defense identification zone immediately after Biden took office on Jan. 20 confirm Beijing’s bold attempt to test the response of the new US administration.
The second article is a column in the British weekly The Economist, which points out that when the US enhanced its relations with Taiwan, some Asia hands (both Democratic and Republican) regarded the preferential policies for Taiwan as a booby trap left by the administration of former US president Donald Trump for Biden, leaving him many obstacles to overcome, whether he is tough or moderate on China.
It is worth noting that former US National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia affairs Evan Medeiros, who served in the administration of former US president Barack Obama, believes that these policy changes are quite difficult.
In the past few years, it has come to the international community’s attention that China has increased its bullying against Taiwan, with military posturing and diplomatic isolation.
Medeiros said that if the US cares about Taiwan, it should not expose Taiwan to greater military pressure.
In his remarks, there is a sense of frustration of having to adopt an appeasement policy toward China, as there is still no effective way to resist the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
As the Trump administration often treated exchanges between the two countries as business transactions or as based on personal relationships, its friendly policies toward Taiwan were all devised by his aides and advisers, aiming to counterbalance the CCP regime, which has increasing power and influence.
During the latter part of the Trump presidency, US policy toward China was dominated by hawks — in particular when Trump blamed China for the spread of COVID-19.
His trusted subordinates also regarded the change in its strategic relationship with China as one of the administration’s major achievements.
This policy not only aroused patriotism, it also helped Trump distract attention from his ineffective COVID-19 pandemic prevention policies in his re-election campaign.
Nevertheless, US-China relations have deteriorated to the point of no return, due to military, diplomatic and economic tensions.
The relationship between Taiwan and the US has greatly improved during the past four years, due to this international situation, and it has become a vent among Taiwanese for many decades being isolated and humiliated by the Chinese communist regime.
It is no wonder that Taiwan has had an unprecedented upsurge in attention since the US presidential election in November last year.
Now that the new US leadership has taken office, major change in the overall thrust of the US’ China policy is unlikely, although adjustments are expected in its implementation.
Biden’s primary task is to tackle the pandemic and restore the US economy, and at the same time resolve the domestic divisions caused by the presidential election.
It is expected that there would be no major adjustments to the Taiwan policy.
In the Biden administration, there are pragmatic officials who are well versed in Asia-Pacific affairs, such as US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell. Campbell’s wife, Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard, served as US undersecretary of the Treasury for international affairs and was responsible for covering APEC.
She knows the Asian economic situation very well.
From the choice of personnel, we can see that economic and trade relations would be the focus of US Asia-Pacific strategic affairs, and the US will likely be more thoughtful and careful in its diplomatic approaches.
US foreign policy has its consistency and continuity, and Biden is not expected to make a U-turn. Under the tendency of anti-China sentiment in US public opinion, Biden’s China policy will unlikely be very different in implementation.
In terms of its global deployment, the US also needs Taiwan’s participation, including on issues such as defense, science and technology, and climate change. Lifting the restrictions on contacts between US officials and their Taiwanese counterparts can facilitate the promotion of Taiwan-US diplomacy.
Taiwan must accurately pinpoint its own strategic position and value, and give full play to its geostrategic advantages and values.
Chang Yan-ting is a professor emeritus at National Tsing Hua University. Paul Chiou is an assistant professor of finance at Northeastern University in Boston.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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